This joint resolution either blocks or approves a specific proposed foreign military sale of defense articles and services to the United Arab Emirates.
Christopher Murphy
Senator
CT
This joint resolution addresses two separate actions regarding foreign military sales. First, it formally blocks a proposed defense article and services sale to the United Arab Emirates. Second, it approves a different, specific sale of non-Major Defense Equipment, spare parts, and support services to the UAE, as detailed in Transmittal No. 2525.
This Joint Resolution is a head-scratcher because it attempts to do two contradictory things at once regarding arms sales to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). First, it explicitly states that a specific, proposed foreign military sale to the UAE is blocked—stopped dead in its tracks. Second, in a separate section, it gives the green light to the sale of a whole list of other defense articles and services that were detailed in a document called Transmittal No. 2525, following standard procedure under the Arms Export Control Act.
Think of this like Congress stepping in to cancel a big appliance order (the disapproved sale) but simultaneously approving the sale of all the necessary spare parts, wires, and maintenance contracts needed to keep the appliances they already own running. The items Congress is approving aren't the major weapon systems; they are classified as "non-Major Defense Equipment." This includes things like Common Munitions Built-in-Test Reprogramming Equipment (CMBRE), spare parts, night vision support, technical documentation, and engineering services. If you’re in tech or manufacturing, this is the equivalent of selling the software updates, proprietary tools, and long-term service agreements.
This resolution has a split impact. On one hand, the entities involved in the specific sale that was disapproved—likely defense contractors and certain government agencies—just saw that deal vanish. This is Congress exercising its oversight muscle to halt a specific transaction they disagreed with. On the other hand, by approving the sale of technical support and spare parts, the U.S. is cementing its long-term relationship with the UAE military. For the U.S. defense industry, this means the revenue stream from ongoing maintenance, support contracts, and spare parts (the stuff that keeps the lights on long after the initial sale) is secured. For the UAE, it means they can keep their existing U.S.-made systems operational, reducing the need to look elsewhere for maintenance.
The most confusing part of this resolution is the internal contradiction. It’s titled as a “disapproval” of a sale, yet it contains an explicit section approving other related sales. This kind of legislative maneuver, blocking one specific action while approving others in the same document, is a classic example of how foreign policy sausage gets made—it’s precise, technical, and often confusing. For those watching how the U.S. manages its security relationships, this signals a highly nuanced, almost surgical approach to arms control: blocking a specific piece of hardware while ensuring the entire system remains functional and reliant on U.S. support.