The GATE Act of 2025 prohibits National Laboratories from admitting foreign nationals from China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, or Cuba, with narrow exceptions requiring high-level certification of U.S. benefit.
Tom Cotton
Senator
AR
The Guarding American Technology from Exploitation (GATE) Act of 2025 prohibits U.S. National Laboratories from granting access to foreign nationals from China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, or Cuba, regardless of the length of their intended visit. This immediate ban applies to both current and future visitors and assignees from these specified countries. Exceptions can only be granted by the Secretary of Energy if they certify that the benefit to the U.S. outweighs the national security risks, following consultation with the FBI. Any granted waiver must be reported to Congress within 30 days.
The Guarding American Technology from Exploitation Act of 2025—the GATE Act—is straightforward: it immediately bans all non-U.S. citizens from China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and Cuba from accessing U.S. National Laboratories. This isn’t a ban on just new hires; Section 2 says that if you are currently working, visiting, or assigned to a National Lab and fit the definition of a "Covered Foreign National," your access is revoked the day this bill becomes law. This applies to everyone, from long-term researchers ("Assignees") to short-term guests ("Visitors").
This bill doesn't mess around with individual security assessments; it uses a broad-stroke approach based purely on nationality. If you are a scientist, engineer, or student from one of the five listed countries, regardless of your personal security history or how long you’ve been collaborating with the U.S. government, you are out. For the National Labs—the places where we do cutting-edge research in energy, physics, and defense—this means an immediate and potentially disruptive halt to any project relying on international talent from these regions. Imagine a team working on a new battery technology; if their lead materials scientist happens to be a Chinese national, that person is immediately barred from the premises, potentially crippling years of work and collaboration.
There is a tiny escape hatch, but it's guarded by some serious gatekeepers. The Secretary of Energy can grant a waiver to allow a "Covered Foreign National" access, but only if they certify in writing that the benefit to the U.S. outweighs the national security and economic risks. To make this call, the Secretary has to consult with the Department of Energy’s top intelligence official and a senior counterintelligence official at the FBI, such as the Assistant Director of the Counterintelligence Division (SEC. 2). This means that even for a routine research collaboration, the approval process involves the highest levels of the national security apparatus, setting an extremely high bar for scientific exchange.
The stated goal here is clear: prevent technology theft and espionage at sensitive facilities. This bill certainly achieves that by eliminating the risk posed by individuals from these specific countries. However, the cost of this blanket ban is significant. U.S. National Laboratories often rely on the world’s best minds to stay ahead, and many critical fields—like high-energy physics or climate modeling—are inherently international. By excluding researchers based solely on their country of origin, the U.S. risks slowing down its own scientific progress and isolating itself from beneficial global expertise. For the average person, this could mean slower development of next-generation technologies that rely on this foundational research, from new medical isotopes to advanced computing.
If the Secretary of Energy does manage to approve one of these rare waivers, they are required to notify Congress within 30 days. This notification must include the individual's country of origin, the access requested, and the exact reasons why the benefit outweighs the risk (SEC. 2). While this ensures strong oversight and transparency for any exception, the overall effect of the GATE Act is to prioritize national security restrictions over scientific collaboration, making it difficult for the National Labs to engage with researchers from nearly a quarter of the world’s population, regardless of their individual merit or contribution.