PolicyBrief
S. 929
119th CongressMar 11th 2025
GATE Act of 2025
IN COMMITTEE

The "GATE Act of 2025" prohibits National Laboratories from admitting citizens of China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and Cuba as visitors or assignees, with a waiver option for the Secretary of Energy under specific conditions.

Tom Cotton
R

Tom Cotton

Senator

AR

LEGISLATION

New GATE Act Bill Proposes Banning Nationals from China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba from U.S. National Labs

Alright, let's break down the "Guarding American Technology from Exploitation Act of 2025," or GATE Act. In plain terms, this bill aims to block citizens from five specific countries – China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and Cuba – from accessing U.S. National Laboratories. This isn't about all foreign nationals; U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents (green card holders) from these countries are explicitly excluded. The ban applies whether someone is just visiting for a short period (defined as a 'visitor,' accessing premises, info, or tech for less than 30 consecutive days) or staying longer (an 'assignee,' accessing for more than 30 consecutive days).

Locking Down the Labs

The core of this bill, outlined in Section 2, is pretty straightforward: if you're a citizen of one of those five listed countries (and not also a U.S. citizen or permanent resident), the doors to National Laboratories are generally closed. These labs, defined according to the Energy Policy Act of 2005, are hubs for sensitive research and development, often involving cutting-edge technology with national security implications. The idea here is clear: prevent potential espionage or theft of valuable American tech by individuals from nations deemed adversarial or of concern.

The Exception Clause: Waivers and Watchdogs

Now, it's not an absolute ban. The bill includes a waiver provision. The Secretary of Energy has the power to grant exceptions, allowing a 'covered foreign national' access. But this isn't a rubber stamp. To issue a waiver, the Secretary must consult with top intelligence officials – specifically, the Director of the DOE's Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence and a 'senior counterintelligence official' from the FBI (like the Director, Deputy Director, or specific Assistant Directors). They need to agree that letting this specific person in provides benefits to the U.S. that outweigh the potential national security and economic risks. If a waiver is granted, the Secretary has 30 days to inform key congressional committees, detailing who got the waiver, from which country, when, and exactly why the benefits were deemed worth the risk.

What This Means on the Ground

So, what's the real-world impact? On one hand, this tightens security around potentially sensitive research, aiming to protect U.S. technological advantages. The goal is to make it harder for specific foreign governments to gain access through their citizens. On the other hand, modern science is incredibly collaborative. This could throw a wrench into research projects that rely on international talent, potentially slowing down innovation if researchers from these five nations, who might be leaders in their fields, are barred from participation or face significant hurdles getting a waiver. The waiver process itself, requiring high-level sign-off and justification, might become a bottleneck, even for individuals deemed low-risk. It essentially draws clear lines based on nationality, impacting scientific exchange while aiming to bolster national security.