This bill establishes a pilot program within the Department of Defense to prioritize partnerships with entities that utilize Army arsenals, aiming to boost workload and efficiency in these facilities.
Richard Durbin
Senator
IL
The Arsenal Workload Sustainment Act establishes a five-year pilot program within the Department of Defense to prioritize partnerships with non-government entities that utilize Army arsenals, particularly those engaging with the Army's Advanced Manufacturing Center of Excellence. This program incentivizes the use of these arsenals by adding a 20% price preference for partners who do so. The Secretary of Defense is required to report to Congress on the program's progress, challenges, and impact on Army arsenal workload and budget.
This bill, the "Arsenal Workload Sustainment Act," kicks off a five-year pilot program within the Department of Defense (DoD) aimed squarely at keeping Army arsenals busy. Established within 90 days of enactment, the program fundamentally changes how some contracts are awarded. It requires the DoD to give preference to private companies, universities, or non-profits – termed "non-public partners" – who team up with and utilize Army-owned manufacturing facilities (arsenals) for government work.
The core idea here is using public-private partnerships to ensure a steady stream of work for the Army's specialized manufacturing sites. The bill mandates a specific preference mechanism: when evaluating bids for certain procurements, if a potential non-public partner doesn't plan to use an Army arsenal, the DoD must add a 20 percent penalty to their proposed price for comparison purposes. Think of it like this: if two companies bid, one using an arsenal and one not, the second company's bid effectively looks 20 percent more expensive, giving the arsenal user a significant leg up. The program further prioritizes partners who utilize the Army's Advanced Manufacturing Center of Excellence and ensure at least a quarter of the partnership's work is done by DoD employees, as stated in Section 2.
On one hand, this approach could directly support skilled jobs and maintain critical manufacturing capabilities within government-owned facilities, potentially leveraging taxpayer-funded infrastructure more effectively. However, the preference system raises questions about competition and cost. By adding that 20 percent price evaluation penalty (Section 2), the bill could limit opportunities for businesses that don't use Army arsenals, potentially reducing the pool of bidders. Fewer bidders can sometimes lead to higher prices, meaning taxpayers might end up paying more. The definition of "non-public partner" is also quite broad, covering corporations, individuals, universities, and nonprofits, without specifying further criteria beyond being outside the U.S. government.
This isn't an open-ended change; it's structured as a five-year test run. To track how it's working, Section 2 requires the Secretary of Defense to report back to key congressional committees within one year. This report needs to cover the nitty-gritty: operational challenges encountered, the actual workload achieved at the arsenals through these partnerships, budget impacts, the expected future workload, and any necessary capital investments identified. Essentially, Congress wants an early assessment of whether this preferential treatment is achieving its goals efficiently and what hurdles exist, providing a mechanism for oversight before the five years are up.