The "BUST FENTANYL Act" aims to combat fentanyl trafficking by enhancing reporting requirements, studying international efforts, prioritizing identification of Chinese entities involved in trafficking, expanding sanctions, and preventing methamphetamine smuggling.
James Risch
Senator
ID
The "BUST FENTANYL Act" aims to combat fentanyl trafficking by enhancing reporting on international narcotics control, studying efforts to address fentanyl trafficking from China and other countries, prioritizing the identification of individuals from China involved in fentanyl shipments, expanding sanctions on those involved in opioid trafficking, and requiring an annual report on efforts to prevent methamphetamine smuggling from Mexico. The act broadens the scope of sanctionable activities related to opioid trafficking and allows for penalties on foreign government entities and officials involved in such activities. It also seeks to strengthen international cooperation and address the role of financial systems in facilitating drug trafficking.
The 'Break Up Suspicious Transactions of Fentanyl Act,' or BUST FENTANYL Act, aims to tighten the screws on international fentanyl and synthetic opioid trafficking. It does this primarily by expanding the U.S. government's power to impose sanctions, demanding more detailed reporting on trafficking efforts, and putting a specific focus on source countries, particularly the People's Republic of China (PRC), but also Mexico, India, and others. Key actions include prioritizing the identification of PRC-linked traffickers sending fentanyl precursors to Mexico, authorizing sanctions against foreign government agencies and senior officials deemed complicit, and broadening the scope of who can be sanctioned for supporting opioid trafficking.
This bill significantly expands who can land on a U.S. sanctions list for opioid trafficking under the existing Fentanyl Sanctions Act. Previously focused more directly on traffickers, Section 5 now allows the President to sanction anyone who knowingly participates in significant activities or financial dealings that help opioid trafficking, receives property known to be linked to it, or provides significant financial, material, or technological support. Think of it as going after not just the main players, but also their financiers, logistics providers, and potentially others enabling the trade. The key words here – "knowingly" and "significant" (defined in Sec. 7203 of the Fentanyl Sanctions Act) – will be critical in how broadly these powers are applied.
Furthermore, Section 6 takes a major step by allowing the President to impose sanctions (like blocking property or restricting financial transactions, as outlined in Sec. 7213 and specifically investment restrictions under Sec. 7213(a)(6)) on parts of foreign governments, including state-owned banks, or senior foreign officials if they are found to have knowingly contributed to or facilitated opioid trafficking. This moves beyond targeting individuals and private companies to potentially holding foreign state actors accountable, raising the diplomatic stakes considerably.
Reflecting current trafficking patterns, the bill puts a strong emphasis on the PRC. Section 4 amends the Fentanyl Sanctions Act (Sec. 7211) to explicitly prioritize identifying individuals and entities in the PRC involved in shipping fentanyl, its precursors, or manufacturing gear to Mexico or other countries that ultimately feed the U.S. market. This prioritization lasts until the President certifies the PRC is no longer the main source.
Section 3 mandates a deep dive report from the State Department and Attorney General within 180 days. They need to detail U.S. efforts to get the PRC to control precursors, assess PRC cooperation (especially regarding its financial system's role), evaluate the impact of potentially sanctioning PRC bank officials, and report on trilateral efforts with Canada and Mexico. Importantly, while the PRC is a major focus, the bill requires the same level of reporting for India, Mexico, and any other country deemed significant in the fentanyl precursor trade, acknowledging the global nature of the problem. A classified briefing on efforts to establish DEA presence and provincial partnerships within the PRC is also required.
The bill also tweaks existing reporting requirements to get a better handle on the evolving drug landscape. Section 2 changes the deadline for the big annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (required under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) to June 1st and adds chemical precursors for methamphetamine that significantly impact the U.S. to the list of things that need to be covered. Similarly, Section 7 amends the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005 to require an annual report specifically on efforts to stop meth smuggling from Mexico and actions taken by source country governments. Together, these changes signal a continued focus on both opioids and methamphetamine precursors flowing into the country.