The "No Hezbollah In Our Hemisphere Act" aims to combat Hezbollah's growing influence in Latin America by assessing terrorist sanctuaries, revoking visas of complicit foreign officials, and imposing sanctions, while also encouraging Latin American countries to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.
John Curtis
Senator
UT
The "No Hezbollah In Our Hemisphere Act" aims to counter Hezbollah's growing influence in Latin America by assessing terrorist sanctuaries, encouraging Latin American countries to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, and imposing sanctions, including visa revocations, on foreign officials from countries that harbor terrorist groups, with potential waivers for national security interests. The Secretary of State is required to aggressively target Iranian proxy networks in the Western Hemisphere by pressuring governments to end impunity for designated individuals and entities. The law sunsets after 5 years.
This bill, the "No Hezbollah In Our Hemisphere Act," sets up a process for the U.S. Secretary of State to identify countries or regions in Latin America as "terrorist sanctuaries." Within 180 days of the law passing, the Secretary, working with other officials, must assess if any location meets this definition, primarily looking at whether groups like Hezbollah or other designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) operate there with government tolerance or inaction (as defined in 22 U.S.C. 2656f(d)(4)). The findings go to key congressional committees. If a place gets this label, the bill mandates specific consequences, though these sanctions are set to expire five years after the law takes effect.
The core of the bill is the potential designation of a "terrorist sanctuary." This isn't just about whether a group like Hezbollah is present; Section 5 requires evaluating if the local government knowingly tolerated or failed to address the group's activities, like fundraising, recruiting, or just finding a safe haven. The assessment uses the definition already in U.S. law (22 U.S.C. 2656f(d)(4)), which guides the State Department's annual terrorism reports. Essentially, the U.S. government will be formally judging whether Latin American governments are doing enough to stop designated terrorist groups operating within their borders.
If a country or region gets slapped with the "terrorist sanctuary" label under Section 5, the main hammer falls on its government officials. Section 6 mandates that these individuals become inadmissible to the U.S. – meaning they can't enter – and ineligible for visas. Any existing visas they hold must be revoked immediately, based on the authority in the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i)). Imagine a finance minister from a designated country suddenly unable to attend meetings at the World Bank in D.C., or a cultural attaché blocked from an event in New York. This targets the officials, not the general population, aiming to pressure the government itself.
The bill isn't entirely rigid. Section 6 includes exceptions: the visa ban doesn't apply if letting the official in helps U.S. law enforcement or is required for UN business in New York. More significantly, the President gets waiver power. They can pause the sanctions for an individual for 180 days, or for an entire jurisdiction for a year, if deemed vital to U.S. national security interests. However, Congress must be notified 15 days before a waiver is granted or renewed, explaining why it's necessary. The President can also terminate sanctions entirely if conditions change and it serves national security, again with prior notice to Congress.
Ultimately, this legislation aims to increase pressure on Latin American governments to actively counter groups like Hezbollah, which Congress finds are expanding operations (Section 2). It encourages using existing tools, like financial task forces (Section 3), and pushes allies to formally designate Hezbollah as a terrorist group. By linking a formal "terrorist sanctuary" designation to tangible consequences like visa bans for officials, the bill creates a direct lever for U.S. foreign policy in the region. The five-year sunset clause (Section 7) means these specific sanctions have a limited lifespan unless renewed.