This bill reforms foreign intelligence surveillance authorities by prohibiting the reverse targeting of U.S. persons, strengthening warrant requirements for targeting individuals in the U.S., and extending the expiration date for Section 702 authority by three months.
Ron Wyden
Senator
OR
This bill enacts significant reforms to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) by prohibiting the "reverse targeting" of U.S. persons and individuals located in the U.S. It also closes loopholes to prevent warrantless surveillance of people inside the country and establishes stricter court supervision, including warrant requirements, for targeting U.S. persons for foreign intelligence collection. Finally, the legislation includes a three-month extension of Section 702 authority.
This bill overhauls how the government uses foreign intelligence authorities to peek into the lives of people on U.S. soil. Its primary mission is to shut down 'reverse targeting'—a practice where agencies monitor a foreigner specifically as a backdoor way to collect data on an American. By updating the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), the bill explicitly forbids targeting anyone outside the country if a 'significant purpose' is to grab the info of a 'covered person' (a U.S. citizen or anyone currently in the States). It also extends the government’s controversial Section 702 spying powers for an extra three months, moving the expiration date from June to September 18, 2026, to keep the lights on while these new rules settle in.
For years, there’s been a concern that if the government wanted to see what a local small business owner or a software dev was up to without a warrant, they could just find a foreign contact that person messaged and monitor the foreigner instead. This bill tries to kill that move. Under Section 1, if the feds are targeting someone abroad specifically to get your data, they are breaking the law. They are also broadening the rules so that if they even 'believe' a target is inside the U.S., they can’t bypass warrant requirements. This shift from 'knowing' to 'believing' is a big deal for your privacy; it means agencies can’t just shrug their shoulders about a target's location to avoid getting a judge’s permission.
Section 3 of the bill sets a much higher bar for the kind of data the government can grab without a criminal warrant or a specific FISA court order. We’re talking about the sensitive stuff: your GPS location data, your web browsing history, and your internet search terms. If you’re a 'covered person,' federal officers generally can't intentionally target you to get this info unless they have a warrant or a court-approved emergency authorization. It also tightens the screws on 'pen registers'—those tools that track who you’re calling or emailing—requiring them to follow standard federal privacy laws or specific FISA court oversight.
Life isn't always black and white, and the bill leaves room for high-stakes scenarios. There is an 'emergency exception' that allows the government to bypass the usual hurdles if there’s an imminent threat of death or serious harm. While this makes sense for stopping a violent crime in progress, the bill requires the government to report these emergency actions to the courts and Congress within 14 days. If a court later decides the emergency wasn't legit, that data becomes 'toxic'—it can’t be used in court or shared with other agencies. This creates a 'use it right or lose it' system designed to prevent the government from calling every investigation an 'emergency' just to skip the paperwork.