The "Defending Defense Research from Chinese Communist Party Espionage Act of 2025" aims to protect national security by prohibiting certain contracts between foreign entities and higher education institutions conducting Department of Defense-funded research, and by imposing post-employment restrictions on researchers involved in critical technology projects.
Jim Banks
Senator
IN
The "Defending Defense Research from Chinese Communist Party Espionage Act of 2025" aims to protect Department of Defense-funded research by prohibiting institutions of higher education from contracting with certain foreign entities and imposing post-employment restrictions on researchers involved in critical and emerging technologies. Waivers to these prohibitions may be granted by the Secretary of Defense under specific conditions, with congressional notification. The Act also requires transparency through public disclosure of waivers and annual reports to Congress.
The "Defending Defense Research from Chinese Communist Party Espionage Act of 2025" aims to cut certain foreign ties in U.S. defense research. Here's the deal: starting January 1, 2027, universities doing Department of Defense (DoD) research can't sign contracts with "covered nations" or "foreign entities of concern." This bill is all about keeping sensitive research out of the wrong hands.
The core of this bill (SEC. 2) is a straight-up prohibition. If your university gets DoD funding for research, it can't partner with entities on the government's watchlist. Think of it like this: if a university is working on cutting-edge drone tech with DoD money, they can't also be collaborating with a company based in a "covered nation" on the same project. The bill defines "covered nations" and "foreign entities of concern," but the practical effect is to limit collaboration with specific countries and organizations the U.S. sees as potential threats.
There's a waiver process, but it's got teeth. Universities need to ask for permission 120 days before signing a contract, providing the full contract (in English!) and a statement from the university president or compliance officer. The Secretary of Defense, along with the Secretary of Education, gets to decide if the contract benefits the university and promotes U.S. interests. Congress gets a heads-up two weeks before any waiver is granted. Existing contracts get a bit of a grace period, but they'll need a waiver within 120 days of this bill becoming law, and those waivers only last until January 1, 2028, at the latest.
Section 3 throws in a major restriction for researchers. If you're the principal investigator on a DoD-funded project involving "critical or emerging technologies," you're barred from working for, or even doing activities on behalf of, a "foreign entity of concern" for ten years after the project ends. Imagine a professor leading a DoD-funded AI research project. Under this bill, they couldn't take a job with a tech company based in a "covered nation" for a full decade after that project wraps up.
The Secretary of Defense gets to decide what counts as "critical or emerging technologies" and will publish a list annually, starting 270 days after the law's enactment. There's a waiver for this, too, but it requires notifying congressional defense committees 30 days in advance. This part of the bill applies to research projects that kick off one year after the law is enacted.
The bill also mandates a lot of paperwork. Universities need a designated "compliance officer" to handle waiver requests. All waiver orders and requests will be published on a public website within 90 days, creating a searchable database. And the Secretary of Defense has to send annual reports to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees starting June 1, 2027, detailing waivers, trends, and compliance efforts. The goal here is transparency, but it definitely adds an administrative burden for universities.
This bill tackles a real concern – protecting sensitive defense research. But it also raises questions about academic freedom and international collaboration. The 10-year employment restriction, in particular, could be a major hurdle for researchers, and the waiver process adds a layer of bureaucracy that universities will have to navigate. The definitions of "covered nation" and "foreign entity of concern" are crucial, as they determine the scope of these restrictions.