New Satellite Cybersecurity Act Mandates Public 'Clearinghouse' for Space Security Resources Within 6 Months

If you’ve ever relied on GPS to get to a job site, used satellite internet for remote work, or seen a weather map on the news, you’re relying on commercial satellite systems. They’re everywhere, and the Satellite Cybersecurity Act of 2025 is designed to shore up their defenses. This bill doesn't impose new regulations right away; instead, it focuses on information sharing, coordination, and strategy. Specifically, it requires the Secretary of Commerce to develop and maintain a publicly available online Clearinghouse of cybersecurity resources for commercial satellite systems within 180 days of enactment, and it mandates a comprehensive study and strategy plan to figure out what the federal government needs to do next.

The Space-Age Cheat Sheet: The Clearinghouse

The biggest, most immediate change for the commercial space sector is the creation of this new Clearinghouse (Sec. 4). Think of it as a centralized, official repository for all the cybersecurity best practices, voluntary recommendations, and reference materials needed to keep satellites and their ground stations safe. This isn't just for the big players; the bill explicitly requires that the Clearinghouse contain materials aimed at assisting "small business concerns." For a startup building specialized sensors for satellites, this means easy access to vetted information on managing supply chain risks or protecting against specific threats like jamming or spoofing—things that can be extremely expensive to figure out on your own. The Commerce Department will also be consolidating voluntary security recommendations covering everything from risk-based engineering to protecting against unauthorized access and physical security for ground control systems.

Why Your GPS Needs a Cybersecurity Checkup

This bill recognizes that attacks on satellites aren't just theoretical; they're real threats that can disrupt daily life. If a satellite system is successfully jammed or hijacked, it affects everyone who relies on those signals—from farmers using precision agriculture tools to truckers relying on navigation, and even the financial sector that uses satellite timing for transactions. The bill specifically calls for recommendations to address protection against threats like jamming (blocking signals), eavesdropping, spoofing (sending false signals), and supply chain risks (vulnerabilities introduced during manufacturing). By centralizing these recommendations, the government is trying to raise the baseline security for the entire sector, which ultimately makes the services we use more reliable.

The Government’s Homework Assignment

Before the government starts making new rules, it wants to understand the current landscape. Section 3 requires the Comptroller General (CG) to conduct a major study on federal actions to support commercial satellite cybersecurity. This study, due within two years, will look at how much federal agencies rely on commercial satellites, how they mitigate risks, and whether they rely on systems owned by foreign entities. This is essentially the government checking its own homework to see if its current efforts are effective and if different agencies are duplicating efforts. The results of this CG study will then feed into the voluntary recommendations and the overall strategy.

The Critical Infrastructure Question Mark

One interesting detail is what the bill doesn't do (Sec. 6). While satellites are clearly essential for modern life—a form of critical infrastructure—the bill explicitly states that it does not officially classify commercial satellite systems as a new critical infrastructure sector. This is a subtle but important point. Critical infrastructure designation comes with certain expectations and sometimes mandatory requirements. By avoiding this classification for now, the bill keeps the security recommendations voluntary and focuses on collaboration rather than immediate regulation. However, it does require the new strategy plan (Sec. 5) to identify the extent to which these systems are already addressed in federal and non-federal critical infrastructure risk plans. This suggests the question of formal classification is still very much on the table for future action, but for now, the approach is information-based and collaborative.