This Act prohibits rental property owners and others from using or providing services that coordinate rental prices, lease terms, or occupancy levels.
Ron Wyden
Senator
OR
The End Rent Fixing Act of 2025 prohibits rental property owners from using coordinators to gather and analyze rental data to recommend prices or terms. This bill makes paying for or performing such "coordinating functions" illegal under federal antitrust law. Enforcement is granted to the FTC, the Department of Justice, and State Attorneys General, and allows harmed individuals to sue for treble damages.
The “End Rent Fixing Act of 2025” is taking direct aim at the software and data services that many large landlords use to set rental prices. Essentially, this bill makes it a major federal antitrust violation for rental property owners to use or pay for any service that collects market data from multiple owners, analyzes it, and then recommends specific rental prices, lease terms, or occupancy levels. It doesn’t matter if it’s a sophisticated algorithm or a simple spreadsheet—if it coordinates pricing strategy between two or more competitors, it’s illegal, and it’s treated as a per se violation of the Sherman Act, which is the legal equivalent of saying it’s automatically price-fixing. This covers everything from apartments and single-family rentals to manufactured home lots (SEC. 2, SEC. 3).
The core of this bill is Section 3, which creates two new federal offenses. First, if you're a landlord, it's now illegal to knowingly pay for or exchange value for the services of a "Coordinator"—the company or person running the pricing software. Second, it's illegal for any person to be that Coordinator. This is a big deal because it targets the entire ecosystem of algorithmic pricing. These services often promise to maximize profits for landlords by ensuring properties in the same area don't undercut each other, effectively acting as a digital cartel. This law seeks to force landlords back into genuine, independent competition, potentially leading to more competitive rents for the millions of people who rent their homes.
This Act hands massive new enforcement power to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and State Attorneys General. If they suspect a violation, they can jump in with civil lawsuits. But the real game-changer is Section 4, which empowers tenants directly. If you are harmed by a landlord engaged in this illegal coordination, you can sue in federal court and, if you win, the court must award you three times the amount of damages you suffered, plus legal costs and attorney fees. This treble damages provision is the traditional sledgehammer of antitrust law, and applying it here means that the financial risk of engaging in rent-fixing just skyrocketed for property owners.
Section 5 tackles a major hurdle in complex antitrust cases: the standard of pleading. Currently, it can be very difficult for government agencies to bring a lawsuit against alleged conspirators unless they can essentially prove the conspiracy before discovery even begins. This bill lowers that bar for the FTC and the DOJ. Specifically, in these rent-fixing cases, the complaint does not need to allege facts that rule out the possibility that the defendants acted independently. This means government agencies have a much clearer path to filing lawsuits and getting to the discovery phase where the evidence of coordination—like internal emails or data logs from pricing software—can be examined. For busy people, this means government watchdogs can act faster and more aggressively against suspected illegal activity.
If implemented effectively, this law could mean real relief in the rental market. For example, if a major apartment complex owner was using a Coordinator to set your rent at $1,800, and without that coordination, the competitive market rate should have been $1,600, you could potentially sue and recover three times the difference in rent paid. While the bill doesn't guarantee lower rents, it removes a major mechanism that critics argue has artificially inflated prices across many metropolitan areas. For the average renter struggling with rising costs, this law is designed to inject genuine market competition back into the housing equation, shifting the power dynamic away from coordinated corporate landlords and back toward the individual consumer.