PolicyBrief
S. 2958
119th CongressSep 30th 2025
AGOA Extension and Bilateral Engagement Act of 2025
IN COMMITTEE

This Act extends the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) through 2027, mandates a strategy for bilateral trade agreements with beneficiary nations, and requires a comprehensive review and certification regarding the U.S.-South Africa relationship due to national security concerns.

John Kennedy
R

John Kennedy

Senator

LA

LEGISLATION

AGOA Trade Benefits Extended to 2027, But New Bill Puts South Africa Under the Microscope

This new piece of legislation, officially the AGOA Extension and Bilateral Engagement Act of 2025, is a two-part deal. The first part is great news for international trade stability: it extends the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) trade program for another two years, pushing the expiration date from 2025 to 2027 (SEC. 101). This means businesses in qualifying sub-Saharan African countries—and the U.S. companies that rely on those duty-free imports—get continued certainty. If you work in textiles or manufacturing that uses imported goods, this extension keeps the supply chain costs stable for now.

The bill also directs the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to get serious about one-on-one trade deals. Within 180 days, the USTR must deliver a strategy to Congress for negotiating bilateral trade agreements with at least five AGOA countries (SEC. 102). This strategy needs to identify nations that are ready to handle the responsibilities of a U.S. trade agreement, checking criteria like democratic principles and the rule of law. Essentially, we’re moving from a broad, general trade preference program to a more targeted approach, which could lead to deeper market access for specific U.S. goods and services down the line.

The South Africa Question: A Full Review

Title II of the bill shifts gears dramatically, focusing laser-like on the relationship with South Africa. Congress is clearly signaling its concern over South Africa’s foreign policy, specifically its perceived alignment with China, Russia, and Hamas (SEC. 201). This isn't just diplomatic hand-wringing; it triggers concrete action. The bill mandates a full, comprehensive review of the entire U.S.-South Africa bilateral relationship, involving the Secretaries of State and Defense (SEC. 202).

Certification and the Sanctions List

The most impactful provision requires the President, within 120 days, to send a report to Congress that includes a formal certification: Has South Africa been acting in ways that harm U.S. national security or foreign policy interests? (SEC. 203). This is a big deal because a negative certification could be used to justify further actions, potentially including removing South Africa from the very AGOA benefits that Title I just extended.

Adding pressure, the bill requires a separate, classified report identifying senior South African government officials and African National Congress (ANC) leaders who might be eligible for sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Act due to corruption or human rights abuses (SEC. 204). For every person listed, the report must either detail the timeline for sanctions or provide a legal justification for not imposing them. While this report is secret, the fact that the U.S. government is compiling a list of potentially sanctionable officials means that the diplomatic relationship is entering a very delicate phase. For regular folks, this is a sign that the political risk associated with doing business in or with South Africa is increasing, which often translates to higher costs or fewer investment opportunities.