The Promoting Resilient Supply Chains Act of 2025 aims to bolster U.S. supply chain resilience by enhancing the Department of Commerce's capabilities to identify vulnerabilities, coordinate responses to disruptions, and encourage domestic manufacturing of critical goods, while establishing a working group and mandating regular reports to Congress.
Maria Cantwell
Senator
WA
The "Promoting Resilient Supply Chains Act of 2025" aims to bolster the stability and resilience of critical U.S. supply chains by expanding the responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Analysis, establishing a working group to assess and address supply chain vulnerabilities, and developing a national strategy for supply chain resilience. The Act directs the Secretary of Commerce to produce a report assessing the Department of Commerce's capabilities related to critical supply chain resilience and manufacturing innovation. It prioritizes domestic manufacturing and collaboration with allied nations while reducing reliance on countries that pose national security risks. The Act is set to terminate 10 years after enactment and does not allocate additional funds for implementation.
This bill, the "Promoting Resilient Supply Chains Act of 2025," sets up a new framework within the Department of Commerce aimed at making sure the U.S. has reliable access to essential goods. It tasks the Assistant Secretary for Industry and Analysis with leading the charge on supply chain stability, particularly for things deemed critical to national and economic security. A key piece is the creation, within 120 days, of a government-wide Working Group to map out these critical supply lines, figure out where the weak spots are, and plan for potential disruptions like pandemics or cyber-attacks (Sec. 2, Sec. 3). The whole setup is designed to sunset, or expire, 10 years after enactment (Sec. 6).
The core job here is figuring out what really matters and where it comes from. The Assistant Secretary, working with this new group, has to officially designate "critical industries," "critical supply chains," and "critical goods" within 120 days, with updates at least every four years (Sec. 3). Think things like semiconductor chips for cars and electronics, specific medical supplies, or key components for energy grids – anything whose absence would seriously hurt the country (Sec. 7 defines these terms). Within a year, the Working Group needs to deliver assessments modeling these supply chains, identifying vulnerabilities, and evaluating U.S. manufacturing capabilities (Sec. 3). This leads up to a national strategy on supply chain resilience due to Congress within 18 months, updated annually (Sec. 3).
A major goal woven throughout the bill is to boost U.S. manufacturing and reduce dependency on potentially risky foreign suppliers. The legislation directs the Assistant Secretary to encourage and incentivize domestic companies and manufacturers to make critical goods here, or at least source them from "ally or key international partner nations" (Sec. 2, Sec. 7). There's a specific push to encourage moving manufacturing facilities out of countries deemed a security risk (referred to indirectly as "countries described in section 7(2)(B)") and into the U.S. or allied nations (Sec. 2). While the aim is greater reliability – maybe fewer empty shelves next time there's a global crisis – shifting complex supply chains often involves significant time and cost for businesses, which could potentially trickle down to consumers.
To get businesses to share sensitive details about their operations, the bill offers a carrot: voluntarily shared "critical supply chain information" gets protected. It generally won't be releasable under public records requests (like FOIA, citing 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3)) or usable in civil lawsuits without consent (Sec. 3). This might make companies more willing to participate, but it also means less public transparency about potential risks and government actions. Here’s the biggest hurdle, though: the bill explicitly states that no additional funds are authorized to carry out any of its requirements (Sec. 5). All the new responsibilities – the Working Group, the extensive assessments, the national strategy, the reporting, the Commerce Department capability review (Sec. 4) – must be absorbed by existing agency budgets. This lack of dedicated resources raises serious questions about how effectively these ambitious goals can actually be achieved.