This Act establishes an Economic Security Working Group within the Quad partnership to enhance cooperation among the U.S., Australia, India, and Japan on supply chain security and countering economic coercion.
Michael Bennet
Senator
CO
The Quad Economic Security Act directs the U.S. to strengthen economic security cooperation with Australia, India, and Japan through the Quad partnership. It mandates the establishment of a new Economic Security Working Group to coordinate efforts on supply chains, critical infrastructure, and countering economic coercion. The bill requires the Secretary of State to report to Congress on negotiations, identified supply chains, and regional partners involved in these security efforts. Finally, the Act specifies that it does not authorize any new funding for its implementation.
The newly proposed Quad Economic Security Act directs the U.S. government to formally establish a dedicated economic security working group with its allies in the Quad—Japan, Australia, and India. Think of this as setting up a joint emergency response team, but for global supply chains and economic pressure.
The bill essentially tells the Secretary of State (working with the Secretary of Commerce) to negotiate the creation of this Economic Security Working Group (Sec. 4). The group’s mission is highly focused: coordinating efforts to protect critical supply chains, securing infrastructure like ports and undersea cables, and creating a shared defense against economic coercion—when one country tries to use trade or finance as a weapon. They are even supposed to run crisis simulations to practice what they’d do if, say, a vital semiconductor factory shut down or a major shipping lane was blocked.
For anyone working in manufacturing, tech, or logistics, this bill is about making sure the parts and materials you rely on actually show up. The Secretary is required to report to Congress a list of specific supply chains deemed critical to national security (Sec. 5). While the bill doesn't name them, this likely includes everything from microchips and rare earth minerals to pharmaceuticals. The goal is to make these supply lines more resilient so that when the next global disruption hits—whether it’s a pandemic, a natural disaster, or geopolitical tension—your company isn't left scrambling for inventory.
Furthermore, the Working Group is instructed to engage with other Indo-Pacific partners to help them beef up their own economic security, potentially focusing on things like making port operations more secure. This means the U.S. is aiming to stabilize the entire regional economic ecosystem, not just the four Quad nations, which could smooth out global trade flows for U.S. businesses.
Here’s where the policy meets the budget reality: Section 7 explicitly states that no additional funds are authorized to carry out this Act. This is a crucial detail. Setting up and running a new international working group, negotiating with three other countries, conducting annual reports, and running crisis drills all require staff time, travel, and resources from the State and Commerce Departments. Since Congress isn't cutting a new check for this effort, these federal agencies must squeeze the necessary funds out of their existing budgets. For the busy folks at State and Commerce, this means they have to shift resources away from other current priorities to staff this new initiative, potentially stretching already thin departments.
The bill also sets up a mandatory reporting loop. As soon as the Secretary of State starts negotiating the Working Group, they must tell Congress exactly which supply chains they’re focusing on and which regional partners they plan to work with (Sec. 5). This provides a necessary check on the Executive Branch’s power. However, the Secretary has broad authority here; the bill doesn't define what a “critical supply chain” is, leaving it up to the Secretary's discretion. They also have the power to define who counts as a “regional partner” for these security talks. This flexibility means the success and focus of the group will heavily depend on who is leading the negotiations, but at least Congress will be kept in the loop with annual updates on the status of the talks until they conclude (Sec. 6).