PolicyBrief
S. 2222
119th CongressJul 9th 2025
Taiwan Undersea Cable Resilience Initiative Act
IN COMMITTEE

This Act establishes the Taiwan Undersea Cable Resilience Initiative to monitor, defend, and harden undersea communication cables near Taiwan against sabotage, while also authorizing sanctions against those responsible for interference.

John Curtis
R

John Curtis

Senator

UT

LEGISLATION

New Act Mandates Sanctions, Hardens Taiwan's Undersea Cables Against Sabotage

If you’ve ever had your internet drop during a crucial Zoom meeting, you know how annoying a bad connection is. Now imagine that on a national scale, not because of bad weather, but because someone intentionally cut the main fiber optic lines connecting your entire country to the rest of the world. That’s the core issue the Taiwan Undersea Cable Resilience Initiative Act aims to tackle.

This bill sets up a major, coordinated effort to protect the critical undersea communication cables around Taiwan. It requires the Secretary of State, working with the Department of Defense, Homeland Security, and the Coast Guard, to launch the Taiwan Undersea Cable Resilience Initiative within 360 days of the bill becoming law. The goal is simple: beef up security against threats, specifically those coming from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which the bill identifies as using “gray zone tactics” like cable sabotage to mess with Taiwan’s economy and security.

The Infrastructure Lifeline: Better Monitoring and Quick Fixes

For most people, these cables are invisible, but they are the literal backbone of global commerce and communication. The Act demands several practical upgrades to keep them running. First, it requires the installation of advanced monitoring systems to spot breaks or sabotage attempts immediately—think of it as a sophisticated, always-on security alarm for the ocean floor. Second, it requires the U.S. to create “quick fix” plans and help Taiwan build the logistics to repair damaged cables fast. This is crucial because minimizing downtime after an attack is just as important as preventing the attack in the first place. For a tech company in Taipei, this means the difference between a minor service interruption and weeks of crippling silence.

Third, the bill pushes for physically “hardening” the critical cables. This means burying them deeper or using stronger materials to make them less vulnerable to accidental damage or intentional tampering. This provision (SEC. 3) is a direct investment in physical resilience, aiming to make it much harder for bad actors to succeed.

Putting the Squeeze on Saboteurs

Here’s where the bill gets tough: sanctions. Section 5 mandates that the President impose serious penalties on any person of the PRC determined to be involved in sabotaging these vital cables. If the U.S. government points the finger at a specific individual or entity from the PRC, two major things happen immediately:

  1. Financial Freeze: All property and financial interests of that person or entity that are in the U.S. or controlled by a U.S. person will be frozen. This is a massive economic deterrent, effectively cutting off access to the U.S. financial system.
  2. Travel Ban: The individual will be barred from entering the U.S., and any existing visas will be revoked. This is a direct consequence for those engaging in state-sponsored sabotage.

This is a strong move, using the power of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to create clear, mandatory consequences. While strong, the scope is wide, relying heavily on the President's determination that a PRC person is “responsible for or involved in” sabotage. The criteria for that determination could be broad, and U.S. entities must be careful to comply with these complex new sanctions rules to avoid penalties themselves.

The View from the Water

The Act also calls for a major upgrade in maritime security. The Coast Guard Commandant and the Secretary of the Navy are required to work with Taiwan and regional allies to improve surveillance and conduct joint patrols, especially in the Taiwan Strait, to spot suspicious activities near the cables (SEC. 3). This is about eyes on the water—making sure that if a foreign vessel is lurking around critical infrastructure, someone is watching and ready to intervene.

Finally, the bill ensures accountability by requiring the President to submit a report to Congress every six months detailing any interference with the cables and exactly what the U.S. government has done in response (SEC. 6). This keeps the pressure on the agencies involved and ensures Congress is kept in the loop about threats and responses. Ultimately, this bill is a clear statement that the U.S. views Taiwan’s digital connection to the world as a critical piece of global infrastructure worth defending with both technology and sanctions.