This bill directs FinCEN to investigate how domestic terrorists procure firearms and accessories by gathering information from financial institutions.
Edward "Ed" Markey
Senator
MA
This bill directs the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) to investigate how domestic terrorists and violent extremists procure firearms and accessories through the financial system. FinCEN must consult with the FBI and ATF before requesting relevant transaction information from financial institutions. The resulting advisory report will detail suspicious procurement activities or explain why sufficient data could not be obtained.
The new Gun Violence Prevention Through Financial Intelligence Act is designed to give federal agencies a better look at how domestic terrorists and violent extremists fund and acquire weapons. Essentially, it tells the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) to start digging into financial transaction data from banks and other financial institutions to identify patterns in how these specific actors buy firearms and accessories for "lone-wolf" attacks. This isn't about tracking every gun purchase; it’s specifically targeting the financial pathways used by known threats to acquire their arsenal, using existing legal definitions for things like "domestic terrorism" (SEC. 2).
Under this bill, FinCEN has up to a year to start asking financial institutions—think banks, credit unions, and others—for information about these suspicious procurement activities. This data request is serious because it operates under the same legal authority used for mandatory suspicious transaction reporting (31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)). For the average person, this means your bank could be required to flag certain types of transactions related to firearms or accessories if they fit the pattern FinCEN is looking for. The bill does include a provision requiring FinCEN to scale these requests based on the size of the financial institution, which is a small win for local credit unions and community banks, but they still have a new compliance burden to deal with (SEC. 2).
One of the most crucial parts of this bill is that FinCEN, along with the FBI and the ATF, has just 90 days to establish a formal rule defining several key terms specifically for this Act. This includes defining what counts as a "firearm accessory," a "homegrown violent extremist," and a "lone wolf" or "lone actor." This is where things get interesting and potentially vague. If these definitions are too broad, the data dragnet could unintentionally sweep up transactions from law-abiding citizens who are just buying parts for their legally owned firearms. We’ll have to wait and see how tight and specific those final rule definitions are, because they will determine the scope of the surveillance (SEC. 2).
Before FinCEN even sends out the data request, they are required to consult with the FBI, the ATF, and, importantly, sellers of firearms and firearm accessories to make sure they are targeting the right information. This consultation is key to ensuring the request isn't just a massive, unfocused fishing expedition. Once the data is collected, FinCEN has 540 days to review it. If they get enough solid intelligence, they must issue an official advisory to banks explaining what suspicious activities look like. If they don't get enough useful data, they have to report back to Congress, detailing exactly why the information was insufficient, how cooperative the financial institutions were, and what roadblocks they hit. This ensures that if the system fails to produce intelligence, Congress knows who or what is responsible (SEC. 2).