PRIME Act Bypasses Competitive Bidding for Military Prototypes, Prioritizing Speed Over Price Checks

The Procurement Reform for Immediate Military Equipment Act, or the PRIME Act, is a short piece of legislation focused entirely on speeding up how the Department of Defense (DoD) buys new military technology. If you’re tracking government spending or contracting, this bill is a major signal that the DoD is prioritizing rapid deployment of new gear, even if it means skipping some of the usual financial safeguards.

The Fast Lane for Prototypes

Right now, when the military wants to test new tech, they use special rules to buy things for “experimental purposes.” The PRIME Act updates this authority (Section 4023 of title 10, U.S. Code) by swapping out a narrow list of purchasable items (like specific types of ordnance or medical gear) for a much broader list that includes prototypes, finished products, designs, and auxiliary services. This basically gives the DoD a wider net to catch new, innovative gear during the experimental phase.

When Speed Trumps Competition

Here’s the real headline: the PRIME Act creates a direct, non-competitive path from a successful experiment straight into full-scale production. If the DoD buys a prototype for testing, and a combatant command—one of the major military commands responsible for a region, like CENTCOM or INDOPACOM—issues a written statement confirming the item worked and they plan to use it, the DoD can immediately award a production contract to that original developer. They can do this without the usual competitive bidding process and without giving advance public notice that they planned to skip competition.

Think of it like this: Normally, the government tests a new prototype, and if it works, they have to open up a new competition, allowing other companies to bid on the contract to manufacture thousands of those items. This ensures taxpayers get the best price. Under the PRIME Act, if a company’s prototype succeeds, they get to jump the line and secure the massive follow-on contract automatically. For the Pentagon, this is about getting effective gear to soldiers faster. For the defense contractor who developed the initial prototype, this is a huge potential windfall, guaranteeing them a production deal.

Who Pays the Price for Efficiency?

While the goal of getting new weapons systems to the field quickly is clear, this change raises immediate questions about oversight and cost. When you remove competitive bidding, you remove the primary mechanism for ensuring the government is getting the best price. Taxpayers rely on competition to prevent cost overruns and inflated prices on large production contracts. If a combatant command can simply sign off on a written statement to greenlight a no-bid contract, the potential for reduced financial scrutiny is significant.

For the larger defense industry, this creates a situation where getting that initial, smaller prototype contract is everything, as it’s the golden ticket to securing the massive, non-competitive production contract down the line. It shifts the focus from winning a competition based on cost and capability for mass production to winning the initial experimental design phase. This could limit opportunities for competing contractors who might be able to produce the same item more efficiently or affordably once the design is proven.