This bill streamlines U.S. defense export controls for Australia and the United Kingdom by exempting certain transfers and eliminating certification requirements for technical assistance agreements.
Pete Ricketts
Senator
NE
The AUKUS Improvement Act of 2025 streamlines defense cooperation under the AUKUS agreement by modifying U.S. arms transfer requirements. This legislation exempts certain defense article reexports and temporary imports between the U.S., Australia, and the U.K. from specific presidential consent requirements. Furthermore, it eliminates the mandatory certification process for commercial technical assistance or manufacturing license agreements involving Australia and the United Kingdom.
The AUKUS Improvement Act of 2025 is all about cutting red tape for defense cooperation between the US, Australia, and the United Kingdom. This legislation essentially greases the wheels of the AUKUS security pact by changing two key sections of the Arms Export Control Act. The main purpose is speed: to make it faster and easier to move defense technology and services between these three allied nations.
Section 2 of the bill creates a major exemption for certain defense transfers. Currently, if the US sells defense articles (like equipment or weapons) to a foreign government, the re-export or re-transfer of that gear usually requires the President’s explicit consent. Think of it like needing permission from the head office every time you want to move high-value inventory between warehouses. This bill eliminates that requirement specifically for transfers happening between the US, the Government of Australia, the Government of the United Kingdom, and certain highly vetted entities (those eligible under 22 CFR 126.7(b)(2)). For the companies and government agencies involved in the AUKUS submarine program or other joint defense projects, this is huge. It means less waiting for approvals, which directly translates to faster project timelines and lower administrative costs. For the rest of us, it means that high-tech defense articles can move between these three countries without the direct, high-level executive review that was previously mandatory under both the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act. It also explicitly authorizes internal transfers—meaning movement within a company or government agency—related to these defense articles, provided the people involved (including dual nationals) meet existing security clearance requirements (SEC. 2).
Section 3 tackles the paperwork surrounding commercial technical assistance and manufacturing license agreements. Right now, when a US company enters into certain defense-related technical assistance or manufacturing agreements with a foreign country, the government often requires a formal certification process. This bill removes Australia and the United Kingdom from that certification requirement entirely. If you’re a defense contractor or a tech firm working on a joint venture with a British or Australian partner, this change means your agreements can be finalized and executed much faster, eliminating a significant bureaucratic hurdle. While the bill keeps the certification requirement in place for agreements with NATO or Japan, it carves out a specific exception for the two AUKUS partners (SEC. 3).
This bill is a classic trade-off between efficiency and oversight. On one hand, the goal of the AUKUS pact is deep military and technological integration, and this bill delivers on that by streamlining the process. It’s a definite win for the defense industry and the strategic goals of the three governments. On the other hand, removing the requirement for Presidential consent and eliminating the need for certification on these agreements means that a layer of executive oversight is explicitly stripped away. While the transfers must still comply with existing regulations regarding who can receive the technology, the highest level of executive review for these specific defense transfers is gone. For the general public, this means less transparency and fewer checks on the movement of sensitive defense articles and technology between the three nations, even if the intent is to foster closer cooperation.