PolicyBrief
S. 1930
119th CongressJun 3rd 2025
Small Biotech Innovation Act
IN COMMITTEE

This bill creates an exception from Medicare drug price negotiation for qualifying small biotech manufacturers based on their level of investment in research and development.

Bill Cassidy
R

Bill Cassidy

Senator

LA

LEGISLATION

Small Biotech Bill Creates High-Stakes R&D Exemption from Medicare Drug Price Negotiation Starting 2029

The Small Biotech Innovation Act (SBIA) is making a crucial change to how Medicare handles drug pricing, specifically carving out a temporary exception for certain small biotech firms. Starting in 2029, drugs developed by these companies will be shielded from Medicare’s price negotiation program, but only if the manufacturer proves they are hyper-focused on research and development (R&D).

The R&D Gauntlet: What It Takes to Qualify

This isn’t a blanket exception; it’s highly conditional. To qualify, a manufacturer must first be considered a “small biotech manufacturer,” meaning they have five or fewer qualifying single-source drugs. They also can’t be owned by a foreign government from a “covered nation.” The real hurdle, though, is the R&D intensity requirement (SEC. 2). To keep their drugs off the negotiation list, these small companies must spend a huge chunk of their average net revenue on R&D over the previous three years. The required percentage is tiered and steep: a company with just one drug must spend at least 30% of its revenue on R&D, while a company with five drugs must spend a whopping 70% to qualify for the exception. This provision is designed to protect the most research-heavy startups, ensuring they have the revenue incentive to keep developing new therapies.

Who Pays the Price for Innovation?

This is where the rubber meets the road for everyday folks, especially those on Medicare. The core purpose of the Medicare drug negotiation program is to lower costs for seniors and the government. By exempting certain drugs, the SBIA is essentially protecting the profits of these small companies to incentivize innovation, but the cost of that protection might be borne by Medicare beneficiaries (SEC. 2). For example, if a life-saving drug developed by a qualifying small firm is shielded from negotiation, seniors relying on that drug might continue to pay higher prices than they would if the price had been negotiated down. This trade-off balances the need for new drugs against the need for affordable access.

The Acquisition Catch: Losing the Shield

One interesting detail addresses the common scenario where a successful small biotech firm gets bought out by a larger pharmaceutical company. The bill includes a provision that makes the exception non-transferable in certain situations (SEC. 2). If a qualified R&D-intensive small firm is acquired after 2029 by a company that doesn't meet the R&D-intensive definition, the drug loses its protected status starting the next plan year. This is a clear signal that the law is trying to prevent large drug makers from simply buying up small firms just to keep high-priced drugs off the negotiation list. For investors and company founders, this adds a major wrinkle to future M&A strategies.

The Administrative Load and Appeal Process

To claim this exception annually, manufacturers must apply to the Secretary, providing detailed records of their net product revenue and R&D spending, and certify that the information is accurate. This process will create a significant administrative burden for both the small firms and the government agency tasked with verifying these complex financial metrics. Recognizing the high stakes, the bill mandates that the Secretary must establish an appeal process for any manufacturer denied the R&D-intensive status. This appeal must be completed quickly, before the list of selected drugs for that year is published, ensuring companies get a fair shot at retaining their protected status.