PolicyBrief
S. 1902
119th CongressMay 22nd 2025
Energy Threat Analysis Program Act of 2025
IN COMMITTEE

This bill establishes the Energy Threat Analysis Program Act of 2025 to enhance collaboration between the government and private industry for analyzing and defending the nation's energy sector against threats.

James Risch
R

James Risch

Senator

ID

LEGISLATION

DOE Proposes New Energy Threat Program, Shielding All Shared Security Data from Public FOIA Requests

The Energy Threat Analysis Program Act of 2025 (ETAP Act) establishes a new program within the Department of Energy (DOE) aimed at beefing up the security of our national energy infrastructure. Think of it as creating a centralized, high-tech neighborhood watch for the power grid, pipelines, and everything else that keeps the lights on. The core mission is to get the government (specifically the DOE’s cybersecurity and intelligence arms) and private energy companies talking better and faster about threats, analyzing them, and then figuring out the best defenses.

The Grid’s New Intelligence Hub

Under Section 3, the Secretary of Energy is tasked with setting up an Energy Threat Analysis Center. This center’s job is to create a clearer picture of the threats facing the energy sector, analyze the tactics of foreign adversaries who might want to mess with the grid, and guide research and development to make our energy systems tougher. This is a practical move: if the government knows a specific vulnerability exists, this program is designed to quickly turn that intelligence into actionable defense advice for the folks running the power plants and transmission lines. The bill authorizes up to $50 million annually for five years (FY2025–FY2029) to make this happen, showing this isn't just a paper exercise.

Who’s In and Who’s Out

The Program is all about collaboration, requiring the DOE to coordinate with federal heavy hitters like CISA, the FBI, and the NSA, as well as state, local, and Tribal governments and private industry. However, the bill gives the Secretary wide latitude on who gets to play and who gets assistance. Section 3 explicitly states that if the Secretary gives help or information to one group, it doesn't mean anyone else has a right to it. More critically, the bill bans any “entity of concern”—a term defined in separate legislation—from participating at all. For a private company, being labeled an “entity of concern” could mean being completely locked out of crucial security intelligence, potentially creating a two-tiered system for grid defense.

The Secrecy Clause: No FOIA Allowed

Here’s the part that policy wonks and journalists will be focusing on: transparency. While the goal of securing the grid is understandable, Section 3 contains a significant provision that shields the Program from public scrutiny. Any information shared between federal, state, Tribal, or local governments under this Act is automatically protected from public disclosure under both the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and any equivalent state or local public records laws. This is a huge deal. If you’re a citizen, a journalist, or an activist trying to understand how the government and private energy companies are coordinating security measures—especially after an incident—this provision seals off that information. It means that while the government and industry are improving their collaboration, the public loses a key mechanism for oversight.

Less Oversight, More Discretion

Further reducing transparency, the Program is explicitly exempt from the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). FACA normally requires that advisory groups established by the government be transparent, publicly noticed, and balanced in their representation. By exempting the ETAP Program, the DOE can run its collaborative efforts with private industry and other agencies without the usual public input or transparency requirements. This combination—the FACA exemption and the blanket FOIA shield—suggests the new security program prioritizes speed and security over public accountability, setting up a potentially powerful, yet highly opaque, government-industry partnership that sunsets in 10 years.