This bill mandates the U.S. Trade Representative to monitor and annually report to Congress on industrial subsidies provided by the Government of the People's Republic of China that pose a risk to U.S. competitiveness and strategic industries.
Margaret "Maggie" Hassan
Senator
NH
This bill mandates the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to closely monitor industrial subsidies provided by the Government of the People's Republic of China. The USTR must then submit an annual report to Congress detailing the risks these subsidies pose to U.S. jobs and strategically critical industries. Finally, the report must recommend specific actions the U.S. government can take to counter these harmful subsidies.
The Strengthen American Competitiveness Against Harmful Subsidies Act of 2025 isn't about slapping new tariffs on imports—at least not yet. This bill is essentially setting up a high-level surveillance system within the federal government, making sure Uncle Sam keeps a detailed, constant tab on the industrial subsidies coming out of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Think of it as installing a very sophisticated, multi-agency radar system aimed squarely at tracking how China supports its manufacturing and tech sectors (SEC. 2).
This isn't a solo mission for the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). The bill requires the USTR to coordinate this monitoring effort with a massive list of federal players, including State, Commerce (both the International Trade Administration and the Commercial Service), Agriculture (specifically the Foreign Agricultural Service), and even the Small Business Administration. The goal is to pool intelligence across the government to understand both current Chinese subsidies and any future plans for new or expanded industrial support programs.
The real meat of the bill is the annual reporting requirement (SEC. 3). No later than one year after the law is enacted, and every year after that, the USTR must deliver a comprehensive report to Congress. This isn't just a list of Chinese subsidies; it’s an active risk assessment. The USTR has to specifically call out which subsidies pose a “major risk” to U.S. jobs and, crucially, to “strategically critical industries” and manufacturing here at home.
For the average person, this matters because the bill is focused on protecting the sectors that keep the lights on and the economy running. A “strategically critical good,” for instance, is defined as any material or product whose absence would significantly hurt national or economic security, or is essential for our “critical infrastructure”—think everything from microchips and specialized metals to components for power grids and transportation networks. If you work in a factory making parts for electric vehicle batteries, or if your company develops AI software, this bill is specifically designed to track foreign actions that might undercut your job or industry.
After identifying the risks, the USTR must then recommend specific actions the U.S. government should take to counter those threats. These recommendations can include new legislation, administrative changes, or “other steps.” This is where the rubber meets the road: the annual report will pressure Congress and the President to act, potentially leading to new trade enforcement actions, new domestic investment programs, or changes in how the U.S. interacts with subsidized foreign goods.
For a U.S. manufacturer—say, a company producing solar panels—this means the government is mandated to identify when a competitor in China is gaining an unfair advantage through massive state support, and then propose concrete ways to level the playing field. Conversely, for a U.S. business that relies on imported components from China, this increased scrutiny could eventually lead to higher costs or new supply chain restrictions if the government decides to act on the USTR’s recommendations. The bill is a procedural mandate, but its ultimate goal is to arm the U.S. government with the data needed to respond to economic competition.
While the bill is clear on the mandate, it does rely on some subjective interpretations. The USTR has discretion in determining what constitutes a “major risk.” This means the scope of the annual report—which subsidies are highlighted and which ones are ignored—could be influenced by the administration’s current political priorities. Furthermore, the requirement to suggest “other steps” beyond specific laws or administrative changes gives the USTR broad latitude to propose potentially sweeping, non-legislative actions. This inherent vagueness is something to watch, as it dictates how aggressively the U.S. government might respond to foreign economic activity in the coming years.