This bill aims to prevent pharmaceutical companies from stifling competition by switching to new versions of their drugs to block generic or biosimilar alternatives from entering the market.
John Cornyn
Senator
TX
The "Drug Competition Enhancement Act" aims to prevent pharmaceutical manufacturers from engaging in "product hopping," a practice that stifles generic and biosimilar competition by switching patients to a new version of a drug before lower-cost alternatives can enter the market. It defines specific actions as unfair competition, including hard switches (removing the original drug) and soft switches (disadvantaging the original drug), while providing manufacturers the opportunity to justify their actions under certain circumstances. The bill empowers the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to enforce these provisions through investigations, injunctions, and financial penalties, ensuring a fair marketplace for drug competition. This act does not limit other antitrust laws or FTC authority.
Ever wonder why your go-to medication suddenly changes form or gets pulled just as a cheaper generic version is about to hit the shelves? A section of the proposed Drug Competition Enhancement Act takes aim at this practice, known as 'product hopping'. The goal is straightforward: stop brand-name drug manufacturers from making strategic tweaks to their products primarily to block competition from lower-cost generic or biosimilar drugs.
This legislation defines 'product hopping' as an unfair method of competition. It specifically calls out two main tactics:
The bill clarifies that simply telling the truth in marketing or deciding to stop selling a drug for legitimate reasons isn't automatically product hopping.
To put muscle behind the rules, the bill empowers the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to step in. If the FTC suspects product hopping is happening, it can investigate, take manufacturers to court to stop the practice (using injunctions), and seek financial penalties. These penalties could include forcing the company to give up 'unjust enrichment' – essentially, the extra profits made through the anti-competitive tactic – and provide restitution. There's a five-year time limit for the FTC to seek these financial remedies.
Manufacturers aren't left without a defense. The bill allows them to argue that their switch wasn't about blocking generics. They can justify their actions if they can prove the switch was necessary for reasons like:
However, the FTC gets the chance to argue back, showing that the anti-competitive harm outweighs any supposed benefits.
Ultimately, this is about competition and cost. By trying to prevent brand-name companies from using strategic switches to extend their market exclusivity, the bill aims to allow generic and biosimilar drugs – which are often significantly cheaper – to enter the market more easily. If successful, this could lead to lower prescription drug costs for consumers and insurers.
However, the effectiveness hinges on how terms like 'unfairly disadvantage' are interpreted and how rigorously the FTC enforces the rules. The justification clause also presents a potential gray area – manufacturers might argue safety or supply issues even when the primary driver is maintaining market share. For patients, while the goal is lower costs, there's also the small possibility that an older, familiar drug might be discontinued if a manufacturer successfully justifies a 'hard switch', although the bill aims to prevent this when done solely to block competition.