The CAMPUS Act requires the identification of Chinese universities aiding the People's Liberation Army and restricts federal funding, facility access, and visas for entities and individuals connected to them, while also promoting US-Taiwan educational partnerships and lowering foreign gift reporting thresholds for universities.
James Lankford
Senator
OK
The CAMPUS Act aims to counter adversarial partnerships by requiring the DNI to identify Chinese universities aiding the People's Liberation Army's Military-Civil Fusion strategy. This identification triggers restrictions on Department of Defense funding, facility clearances for classified information, and visa eligibility for associated individuals. Additionally, the bill lowers the threshold for universities reporting foreign gifts and promotes Mandarin language education partnerships with Taiwan.
The newly proposed Countering Adversarial and Malicious Partnerships at Universities and Schools Act of 2025, or the CAMPUS Act, is a major legislative move aimed at cutting off U.S. funding and access for entities linked to China’s military-civil fusion strategy. Think of it as a comprehensive policy firewall being built around U.S. defense research, education, and classified information.
This bill tasks the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with creating a recurring list of universities in the People's Republic of China (PRC) that are actively helping the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) or participating in China’s “Military-Civil Fusion” strategy (Sec. 2). This isn't just an academic exercise; this list has immediate, real-world consequences. If you are a defense contractor, your facility cannot be approved to hold classified information if your company has an active research partnership with any institution on that DNI list (Sec. 4). Furthermore, the Department of Defense (DoD) cannot give any research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) funds to any contractor that has a contract with a listed institution (Sec. 3).
This means if your small engineering firm relies on DoD grants and also happens to have a paid research collaboration with a university that lands on the DNI’s list, you could lose your entire federal funding stream overnight. It forces U.S. researchers and companies to choose one or the other, aiming to prevent even indirect leakage of sensitive U.S. defense technology.
Section 5 of the CAMPUS Act gives the Secretary of State a powerful new tool: the authority to deny F (academic student) and J (exchange visitor) visas to any applicant who is a student or employee at an institution identified on the DNI’s blacklist. This is a significant change. Instead of evaluating individuals based on their own merits or potential security risks, the State Department can now block entry based solely on the institution they attend or work for. For students and researchers from China, this means the academic institution they choose could suddenly become a barrier to studying or working in the U.S., regardless of their field of study or individual intentions.
The bill also tightens the screws on education funding and transparency. For K-12 schools that receive federal funds, Section 6 prohibits them from contracting with any company domiciled in the PRC. This is extremely broad. While intended to prevent malign influence, this could complicate things for schools using Chinese-based educational software, language programs, or even certain basic supplies if those contracts are considered prohibited. Meanwhile, universities face a massive new administrative burden: the threshold for reporting foreign gifts and contracts to the Department of Education is slashed from the current $250,000 down to $50,000 (Sec. 9). This means U.S. colleges will have to track and report five times as many smaller transactions, which could significantly increase compliance costs.
Amidst all the restrictions, Section 7 focuses on building a positive alternative. It directs efforts to strengthen partnerships between the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representatives Office (TECRO) to boost Mandarin language and Chinese cultural education in the U.S. The Secretary of Education is authorized to issue grants to K-12 schools and colleges that set up these programs through the Taiwan partnership. This aims to provide U.S. students with access to Mandarin instruction and cultural exchange that is explicitly separated from mainland Chinese influence.