This Act restricts Department of Homeland Security funding for U.S. colleges and universities that maintain relationships with Confucius Institutes, the Thousand Talents Program, or designated Chinese Entities of Concern.
August Pfluger
Representative
TX-11
This Act restricts federal funding from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for U.S. colleges and universities that maintain relationships with Confucius Institutes or designated "Chinese Entities of Concern." These entities are broadly defined to include Chinese schools involved in military fusion, intelligence support, or human rights abuses. Institutions must sever ties with these groups to remain eligible for DHS funding, though limited, case-by-case national security waivers may be granted. The DHS is also required to report annually to Congress on the implementation of these restrictions.
| Party | Total Votes | Yes | No | Did Not Vote |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Democrat | 213 | 55 | 153 | 5 |
Republican | 220 | 211 | 0 | 9 |
This bill, officially titled the DHS Restrictions on Confucius Institutes and Chinese Entities of Concern Act, is straightforward but carries a massive financial threat to universities. Starting 12 months after enactment, any U.S. college or university that maintains a financial or contractual “relationship” with a designated Chinese organization will be completely cut off from all funding from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Essentially, if your school wants that DHS grant money—which funds everything from campus security research to specific science programs—it has to sever all ties with the listed entities first.
This isn’t just about the well-known Confucius Institutes (cultural centers funded by the Chinese government) or the Thousand Talents Program (a recruitment program run by the Chinese Communist Party’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology). The bill creates a broad new category: Chinese Entity of Concern. This net is cast wide, catching any Chinese university involved in “military-civil fusion,” supporting China’s defense industry, or aiding Chinese security, police, or intelligence agencies. Crucially, it also includes schools that actively try to hurt the U.S. relationship with Taiwan, or are involved in the persecution of Uyghur Muslims or online disinformation campaigns targeting U.S. elections. The definition of a “Relationship” is equally broad, covering “any contract, agreement, gift, or in-kind donation” received from these groups.
For universities, this means walking a tightrope. Say your school has a small, non-sensitive research agreement with a Chinese university that the Secretary of Homeland Security later designates as a “Chinese Entity of Concern.” Under Section 2(b), that single agreement could immediately jeopardize millions in DHS funding—money that might support student scholarships, critical infrastructure research, or even campus police technology. The only way to get the DHS funding back is to terminate the relationship completely. This forces U.S. institutions to choose between maintaining international academic ties and receiving federal security funding.
The bill does offer a temporary escape hatch, but it’s entirely dependent on the Secretary of Homeland Security. Under Section 2(c), the Secretary can grant a one-year waiver, renewable annually, that allows the school to keep both the DHS funding and the Chinese affiliation. To get this temporary pass, the university must prove two things: first, that it has “robust safeguards” to prevent the Chinese affiliates from accessing sensitive U.S. research or data; and second, that the relationship either serves the U.S. national security interest or poses no direct or indirect national security risk. This places enormous discretionary power in the hands of the DHS Secretary, who must consult with the Director of National Intelligence before deciding. While this mechanism is intended to protect beneficial, non-threatening partnerships, its reliance on a subjective national security interest standard leaves universities vulnerable to political shifts.
If you’re a graduate student relying on a DHS grant to study cybersecurity, or a professor whose research lab relies on equipment purchased with DHS funds, this bill creates immediate uncertainty. Your funding stream is now tied directly to the international agreements made by your university administration—agreements you likely have no control over. Furthermore, the broad, sometimes subjective, criteria for designating a “Chinese Entity of Concern” could lead to a chilling effect, where universities proactively terminate any relationship with Chinese institutions just to stay in the clear and protect their federal funding, even if those relationships were purely academic or cultural. The bill requires the Secretary to report annually to Congress on how these rules are implemented, including details on any school that received a waiver, ensuring that these institutional relationships remain under a constant, watchful eye.