Fentanyl Sanctions Bill Expands Targets to PRC Officials and Adds Strict New Oversight to Presidential Emergency Powers

The “Stop Chinese Fentanyl Act of 2025” is a multi-faceted bill aimed at disrupting the flow of precursor chemicals used to make illegal opioids, primarily by tightening the screws on specific entities and officials in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It starts by sending a diplomatic message, urging the PRC to step up its game on controlling these chemicals, specifically asking for better labeling on shipments, and the implementation of “know-your-customer” rules to prevent illegal diversion (SEC. 2).

The Sanctions Hammer Gets Heavier

The biggest change here is how the U.S. defines a “foreign opioid trafficker” under the existing Fentanyl Sanctions Act. The bill expands this definition to specifically target PRC entities and officials. This now includes any PRC entity that the President determines is involved in the supply chain but fails to take real steps to stop trafficking. Think of a chemical distributor who looks the other way when selling large quantities to known shady buyers—they could now be designated as a trafficker (SEC. 3).

It also targets senior PRC government officials who have regulatory control over these problematic entities but who allow the trafficking to happen through “intentional inaction.” If you’re a mid-level bureaucrat with the power to shut down a trafficker but you do nothing, you could face sanctions. This is a significant expansion of authority, giving the Executive Branch broad power to decide what counts as “real steps” or “intentional inaction”—a detail that could make or break legitimate businesses operating in the region. Furthermore, once designated, the review period for these sanctions is being stretched from 5 years to 10 years, meaning these designations will stick around much longer before they are automatically re-evaluated (SEC. 3).

New Rules for Presidential Emergency Powers

For those who pay attention to how the government uses its special powers, Section 4 introduces some serious new oversight. If the President declares a national emergency related to international drug trafficking—which has happened several times in recent years—they now have to jump through new hoops. Specifically, they must provide annual written reports to key Congressional committees detailing how effective the emergency actions are and what the public and private sector think about them (SEC. 4).

More importantly, when issuing regulations under these emergency powers, the President must now perform a cost-benefit analysis of alternative actions and, critically, set clear criteria for when the national emergency will be considered over and terminated. This is a big deal because it forces the administration to define the exit ramp before they start using the emergency powers. It’s an effort to prevent indefinite emergency declarations, adding transparency and accountability to the process.

Protecting the Import Lane

Finally, the bill includes a crucial guardrail for everyday trade. While it ramps up sanctions on specific bad actors, it explicitly states that the sanctions authorized by this Act cannot be used solely to sanction the importation of goods (SEC. 5). This means if you’re a small business importing legitimate products like clothing or furniture from China, this bill cannot be used to block your shipments just because they are imports. The sanctions must be tied to the specific trafficking activity. However, there’s a small exception: the protection doesn't apply to “technical data,” so things like blueprints, software, or design files could potentially still be targeted if they are linked to trafficking activities.