ARMAS Act Moves Firearm Export Control Back to State Dept., Mandates End-Use Tracking for 12 Nations

The Americas Regional Monitoring of Arms Sales Act of 2025, or the ARMAS Act, is a major policy shift aimed squarely at slowing the flow of U.S.-origin firearms fueling violence and organized crime in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. If passed, this bill essentially hits the 'undo' button on a 2020 decision that moved regulatory control of certain firearm exports from the State Department (which focuses on foreign policy and human rights) to the Commerce Department (which focuses on trade promotion).

The Great Regulatory Switcheroo

The core of the ARMAS Act (Section 3) is the transfer of export control authority for specific munitions—items that were on the State Department's Munitions List before 2020 but later moved to the Commerce Control List. The bill requires the Commerce Department to hand that authority back to the State Department within one year. This matters because the Commerce Department has approved about 95% of license applications since taking over, leading to a reported 30% jump in firearm exports. The State Department, with its tighter focus on foreign policy implications and human rights, is expected to be a much tougher gatekeeper. For U.S. gun manufacturers, this means navigating a more complex and potentially slower approval process for exports, particularly to the designated regions.

Crucially, the bill explicitly prohibits the Commerce Department from taking any action to promote the export of these newly controlled items (Section 10). This ends the dual-hatted approach where a government agency was both regulating and promoting the sale of these weapons abroad.

The ‘Covered Country’ List and New Hurdles

Section 7 automatically designates 12 countries—including Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, and Haiti—as "covered countries" for a mandatory five-year period. This designation triggers a massive increase in monitoring and certification requirements. Before any covered munition can be transferred to one of these nations, the Secretary of State must certify to Congress that a robust tracking and monitoring program is in place to prevent unauthorized retransfer and track usage (Section 8).

This isn’t just paperwork. The program requires maintaining detailed records of the origin, shipping, and serial numbers of all exported munitions and ensuring end-use monitoring. If you’re a law enforcement official in a designated country, this means improved access to the ATF’s eTrace program for tracking crime guns (Section 5), with the added detail that the eTrace system must be made available in French and Haitian Creole for authorities in Haiti. The goal is to close the loop: if a U.S.-sourced firearm is used in a crime in, say, Guatemala, the U.S. government should have the data trail to follow it back to the original authorized recipient.

Congressional Oversight and the Waiting Game

For any item newly moved back to the State Department’s control, the bill introduces a mandatory waiting period before an export license can be granted (Section 9). The Secretary of State must notify Congress of the proposed sale, including the recipient, the items, and the value. For NATO allies and a few close partners, the waiting period is 15 days. For all other countries, including the newly designated covered countries, the wait is 30 days. During this time, Congress can pass a joint resolution to block the sale. While increased oversight is generally good, this provision adds a significant layer of delay and political risk to international defense sales, even those that are routine.

The Real-World Impact

For people living in the designated countries, this bill aims to reduce the pipeline of U.S. firearms contributing to local violence—a key driver of instability and migration. For instance, the bill notes that U.S. firearms account for 70% of those recovered from crimes in Mexico. If the ARMAS Act works as intended, it should make it significantly harder for criminal organizations and cartels to acquire weapons like those used in the tragic kidnapping and killing of U.S. citizens in Matamoros.

However, the bill introduces a degree of ambiguity. Section 7 gives the Secretary of State broad authority to designate a country as “covered” if it meets the geographic and non-NATO criteria plus “any other requirements the Secretary determines are appropriate.” This discretionary power could create uncertainty for nations not on the initial list, as their export status could change based on evolving, potentially subjective, criteria. Furthermore, while the heightened scrutiny is necessary, it could slow down legitimate transfers of covered munitions needed by partner governments for their own security forces, creating a bureaucratic logjam that impacts their ability to respond to security threats.