New Mineral Security Act Creates Global Alliance, Funds Domestic Mining with New Tariffs

The “Restoring American Mineral Security Act of 2025” is a major trade and industrial policy bill aimed squarely at securing the U.S. supply chain for critical minerals—the stuff that powers everything from electric vehicles and smartphones to advanced defense systems. The core idea is to build a trusted global supply chain that bypasses countries of concern, particularly China, which the bill explicitly states has “weaponized its market dominance.”

This isn't just about mining; it's a strategic move using tariffs as leverage. The bill authorizes the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to create a Critical Minerals Security Alliance. To join this club, allied nations must essentially agree to do two things: first, they have to eliminate their own tariffs on critical minerals and select derivative products coming from other Alliance members. Second, and crucially, they must raise their tariffs on the same products coming from “Foreign Countries of Concern”—like China—to match or exceed the high U.S. tariff rates currently in place. If a country joins, its critical mineral imports (and specific derivative products like EV batteries and permanent magnets) get to enter the U.S. duty-free. This is a massive incentive for allies to align their trade policy with ours.

The Tariff-Funded Investment Engine

Here’s where the policy gets really interesting for the average taxpayer and U.S. industry. The bill creates a Critical Mineral Mining and Processing Trust Fund (SEC. 6). This fund will be filled entirely by the duties collected on imported critical minerals and select derivative products. But here’s the kicker: once the first allied country joins the Alliance, the U.S. automatically imposes high tariffs on all such imports coming from “Foreign Countries of Concern,” mirroring the rates that applied to China under Section 301. Those new tariff dollars are immediately funneled into the Trust Fund.

This money is then allocated to subsidize domestic projects: 60 percent goes to the Department of Energy’s Loan Programs Office, 20 percent to the Department of Defense, and 20 percent to the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). This means that if you run a U.S. company looking to process lithium, manufacture EV batteries, or open a domestic mine, this bill creates a dedicated, self-sustaining stream of federal funding for your project. The goal is to rapidly scale up U.S. capacity using foreign tariffs as the investment capital.

What This Means for Consumers and Manufacturers

If you’re a U.S. manufacturer who currently relies on cheaper processed minerals or components (like magnets or battery parts) sourced from a “Foreign Country of Concern,” you need to pay attention. Once the Alliance is formed, the cost of your inputs will jump due to the new tariffs imposed under Section 5. For example, if a manufacturer of small electronics currently imports a specific magnet from a Chinese supplier, that magnet will suddenly face a significant new duty, raising the manufacturer's costs. This policy essentially forces U.S. buyers to switch their supply chains to Alliance member countries, who now enjoy duty-free access, or to domestic producers subsidized by the new Trust Fund.

For the DFC, the bill also provides new flexibility, allowing it to fund critical mineral projects in upper-middle-income or high-income allied countries (SEC. 6). This is usually restricted, but under this bill, the DFC can now support these projects if the President certifies they are necessary to counter a strategic competitor—a clear mechanism to fund projects in allied nations to secure supply chains away from China.

The Fine Print on Congressional Power

In terms of how this Alliance gets built, the USTR is given significant negotiating authority. When the USTR certifies that a country is ready to join, the agreement can take effect in one of two ways: either Congress explicitly approves it, or 90 days pass and Congress fails to pass a joint resolution disapproving the agreement (SEC. 4). This “90-day clock” shifts the burden of action entirely onto Congress. If they are busy or divided, new trade agreements could automatically take effect, granting the USTR substantial power to reshape global trade relationships quickly. This mechanism is something smart, busy people need to note, as it concentrates significant authority in the executive branch over trade policy.