This Act prohibits rental property owners from engaging in coordinated activities that effectively fix or influence rental prices, treating such coordination as an illegal restraint of trade under existing antitrust laws.
Becca Balint
Representative
VT
The End Rent Fixing Act of 2025 prohibits rental property owners from hiring coordinators or engaging in activities that involve collecting, analyzing, or recommending rental prices or terms across multiple properties. This coordinated activity is deemed an unlawful restraint of trade under existing antitrust laws. The bill grants enforcement power to the FTC, the Attorney General, and State Attorneys General, while also allowing injured persons to sue for treble damages. Furthermore, it lowers the pleading standard for civil lawsuits brought under this Act and related antitrust claims.
The “End Rent Fixing Act of 2025” aims to crack down on what it defines as anti-competitive behavior in the rental housing market. Specifically, the bill makes it illegal for rental property owners to pay for or engage in a “coordinating function.” This function is defined broadly as collecting rental data (prices, supply, lease terms) from two or more property owners, analyzing that data using similar formulas—including training algorithms—and then recommending rental prices, lease terms, or occupancy levels back to those owners (SEC. 2).
Essentially, the legislation targets the use of shared software or services that aggregate market data and suggest pricing to landlords. Crucially, the bill immediately labels engaging in this coordinating function as an illegal method of competition under the Federal Trade Commission Act and an automatic violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (SEC. 3). If you’re a property manager using software that pulls data from competitors and suggests your next asking price, this bill says that’s price fixing.
This is where things get tricky. The bill’s definition of a “Coordinator” is wide enough to include any person—or software company—who performs this function, even if a rental property owner does it for their own benefit (SEC. 2). The goal is clearly to stop landlords from using shared, sophisticated software to indirectly coordinate pricing, but the language is vague enough that it could potentially sweep up legitimate market research or industry benchmarking. Think about a small-time landlord who uses a popular, industry-standard pricing tool: if that tool pulls data from other users and uses a common formula to suggest a rent increase, that landlord could be in violation.
For the millions of renters out there, the intended benefit is clear: if landlords can no longer rely on these shared data tools, competition should increase, potentially leading to lower or at least more varied rental prices. The bill is trying to restore the kind of decentralized, competitive pricing you’d expect in a healthy market.
Beyond just banning the practice, the bill creates a massive legal stick. Federal agencies like the FTC and the Attorney General gain explicit authority to enforce this Act, as do State Attorneys General (SEC. 4). But the biggest change is for private citizens. If you are a renter harmed by a violation, you can file a civil lawsuit and, if you win, the court must award you three times the damages you sustained, plus attorney fees and simple interest (SEC. 4(d)).
This mandatory triple-damage provision is a huge incentive for litigation. It means that even a modest overcharge in rent could turn into a major financial liability for property owners. Furthermore, Section 5 significantly lowers the bar for bringing these antitrust claims. Courts are instructed not to dismiss these cases unless it’s absolutely certain the plaintiff can’t win, effectively making it easier for renters to get past the initial filing stage and into discovery. This shift in legal procedure, combined with the mandatory fee awards, means property owners face a high risk of costly litigation, even if the claims are weak.
Another significant provision directly impacts existing agreements. The bill states that if a person chooses to sue under this Act, any prior agreement to arbitrate the dispute or any waiver of the right to join a joint action (like a class action) is considered invalid (SEC. 4(e)). For many renters and property owners who signed leases containing mandatory arbitration clauses, this effectively voids that part of the contract specifically for disputes related to this “rent fixing” law. While this might be seen as leveling the playing field for renters, it’s a direct intervention into contractual freedom and overrides existing business practices.
In short, the “End Rent Fixing Act” takes a very aggressive approach to the use of data in the rental market. It bans the use of shared pricing algorithms, arms renters with a powerful legal mechanism (triple damages and voided arbitration), and significantly lowers the legal hurdle for bringing antitrust lawsuits against property owners. While the intent is to drive down rents, the broad definitions and severe penalties could create regulatory uncertainty and massive litigation risk for every rental property owner, from large firms to small-time landlords using common property management software.