This Act establishes a policy and framework for coordinating with allies to protect the global semiconductor supply chain from control by adversarial nations like the Chinese Communist Party.
Bill Huizenga
Representative
MI-4
The Semiconductor Technology Resilience, Integrity, and Defense Enhancement Act (STRIDE Act) aims to protect U.S. technological leadership by coordinating with allies to secure the global semiconductor supply chain against adversarial control, particularly from the Chinese Communist Party. The bill mandates the State Department to align export controls and establish trusted supplier networks with key semiconductor partners. It also outlines consequences, including enhanced export restrictions, for nations that fail to prevent technology transfer to countries of concern.
The aptly named Semiconductor Technology Resilience, Integrity, and Defense Enhancement Act (STRIDE Act) is a laser-focused bill aimed at protecting the U.S. lead in microchips. Essentially, this legislation declares that the global semiconductor supply chain is a matter of national security, and it puts the Secretary of State in charge of getting all our allies on the same page regarding export controls. The goal is to prevent technology, equipment, and intellectual property (IP) from falling into the hands of foreign adversaries, specifically naming the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), who the bill claims are trying to use this technology for military modernization and human rights violations.
If you use a computer, drive a modern car, or carry a smartphone, you rely on microchips. This bill recognizes that the technology used to design and manufacture these chips—things like lithography systems, design software, and specialty materials—is critical infrastructure. The policy is simple: maintain technological leadership and coordinate with allied partners to secure the supply chain (SEC. 3). This is about making sure that U.S.-origin technology and IP don't end up helping competitors gain a military or technological edge.
Section 4 is where the rubber meets the road. It mandates the Secretary of State to coordinate with foreign governments that have significant chip capabilities—think Japan, South Korea, and the Netherlands—to align export control policies. This coordination isn’t just about the final chip; it covers everything: the manufacturing equipment, the design tools, the dual-use materials like specialty gases, and even technical assistance and equipment servicing. The idea is to create a unified front that prevents adversaries from simply buying the technology from a third country if the U.S. restricts it.
Here’s the part that gives the State Department some serious leverage: the bill sets up a mechanism for accountability. If the Secretary of State determines that an allied country isn't implementing strong enough security measures to prevent technology transfer to “countries of concern,” things get serious (SEC. 4(c)). The Secretary must explain the deficiencies and request that the Department of Commerce convene a special review board within 21 days to fix the problem.
Crucially, the Secretary of State can recommend applying the Foreign Direct Product Rule (FDPR) restrictions to chips made in that non-cooperating country if they incorporate U.S.-origin technology or software. For the average person, the FDPR is a big deal because it means the U.S. can essentially halt the flow of products made abroad if they rely on U.S. technology. This is a powerful trade tool, and using it against an ally would be a major diplomatic escalation. It’s a mechanism designed to ensure that if you want access to the U.S. tech ecosystem, you need to play by the security rules the U.S. sets, even if you’re a partner nation.
This bill won't directly change the price of your laptop tomorrow, but it aims to secure the foundation of the modern economy. For U.S. chip manufacturers and designers, this bill is a win because it promises to protect their intellectual property and prevent competitors from leapfrogging them using stolen or restricted tech. For allied nations, this means tighter regulations, more paperwork, and potentially higher costs for companies that deal in chip manufacturing equipment or materials, as they must comply with harmonized, stricter export controls. For foreign entities trying to acquire this technology through third countries, the bill is designed to close those loopholes, making it much harder to get the advanced tools needed for cutting-edge chip development. In short, the STRIDE Act is a blueprint for making sure that when it comes to the future of technology, the U.S. and its partners are controlling the flow, not the adversaries.