This Act streamlines U.S. arms export controls and eliminates certain certification requirements for defense transfers and technical agreements involving Australia and the United Kingdom under the AUKUS partnership.
Gabe Amo
Representative
RI-1
The AUKUS Improvement Act of 2025 streamlines defense cooperation between the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom. This legislation eases restrictions on the export, re-export, and transfer of defense articles among the three nations, removing certain presidential authorization requirements. Furthermore, it eliminates specific certification requirements for technical assistance and manufacturing license agreements conducted within Australia or the United Kingdom. Overall, the bill aims to increase flexibility and efficiency in defense trade and technology sharing under the AUKUS partnership.
The AUKUS Improvement Act of 2025 is basically a fast-pass lane for defense technology moving between the U.S., Australia, and the U.K. This bill is designed to accelerate the AUKUS security partnership by cutting out several layers of required government sign-off for transferring defense articles and technical know-how among the three nations. Specifically, it eliminates the need for Presidential permission on certain re-exports and removes a key certification requirement for technical assistance and manufacturing deals happening in Australia or the U.K., speeding up collaboration on defense projects.
Section 2 of the Act focuses on making sure U.S.-origin defense items sold to Australia or the U.K. can move around quickly within the AUKUS partnership without hitting bureaucratic speed bumps. Normally, if Australia wanted to re-transfer a U.S.-made missile component to the U.K. for a joint project, they’d need the U.S. President’s permission under the Arms Export Control Act. This bill says: skip that. Re-exports and transfers between the three governments, or certain approved entities, are now exempt from that requirement. This is a huge win for efficiency, meaning joint military projects can move faster without waiting weeks or months for executive approval.
This flexibility also extends right down to the factory floor. The bill simplifies the internal movement of defense articles and services within companies working on these deals. This means that if you’re a U.K. or Australian engineer working for a U.S. defense contractor on a joint project, you can handle sensitive U.S. defense technology—even if you’re a dual national—as long as you meet the specific security and eligibility standards defined in existing federal regulations (like 22 CFR 120.64). For the defense contractors and their employees, this means less time spent on paperwork and more time spent building the actual systems.
Section 3 tackles the administrative headache of technical assistance and manufacturing license agreements. Under current law, when U.S. companies enter into certain major defense deals with foreign partners, they often need a specific government certification—a congressional checkpoint—before the deal can proceed. This Act eliminates that certification requirement entirely for agreements involving technical assistance or manufacturing licenses that are executed in Australia or the U.K. If your U.S. company wants to license a component design to a manufacturer in Adelaide, for example, you can now bypass that specific certification step. This is a massive reduction in oversight, designed to get technology flowing faster to our allies.
While this streamlined process is great for accelerating the AUKUS pact—benefiting U.S. defense companies and the governments of Australia and the U.K.—it’s worth noting who bears the cost: oversight. By eliminating the Presidential permission for re-exports and the certification requirement for manufacturing deals, the bill significantly reduces the mandatory executive and congressional review points for sensitive technology transfers. The goal is speed and efficiency, but the trade-off is a reduction in the highest level of security vetting that these transfers previously required. It’s a calculated risk aimed at bolstering the partnership, but it shifts the burden of security compliance more heavily onto the industry partners and the existing, less visible regulatory frameworks.