This Act authorizes the President to issue letters of marque and reprisal to private groups to seize assets or persons involved in foreign-based cybercrime and scam operations against the United States.
David Schweikert
Representative
AZ-1
The Scam Farms Marque and Reprisal Authorization Act of 2025 authorizes the President to issue official letters of marque and reprisal against foreign entities engaged in cybercrime. This grants private groups the authority to seize the property or persons of those involved in specified cyberattacks, including ransomware and large-scale scams. The Act establishes a legal framework for the U.S. to retaliate against transnational criminal enterprises operating overseas.
The Scam Farms Marque and Reprisal Authorization Act of 2025 is a piece of legislation that sounds like it was ripped straight out of a history book—or maybe a dystopian novel. It grants the President the authority to issue official "letters of marque and reprisal" to private citizens or groups. Historically, this was a license for privateers (legal pirates) to attack and seize the ships and property of an enemy nation. Today, the target is modern cybercrime, but the mechanism is just as aggressive.
What this bill actually does is create a formal, government-sanctioned path for private security firms or specialized groups to conduct offensive operations outside U.S. borders. If the President determines that a foreign entity, including a foreign government, is running a cybercrime operation against the U.S.—think ransomware, identity theft, or those brutal "pig butchering" scams—they can commission a private group to go after them. This means seizing the person or property of the criminal enterprise overseas (SEC. 3). For the average person, this is the government saying, “We’re hiring private contractors to go get back the crypto stolen from your retirement fund, or the data stolen from your company, wherever the criminals are hiding.”
The list of qualifying cybercrimes is wide-ranging, covering everything from basic computer fraud (under 18 U.S. Code § 1030) to modern threats like ransomware and cryptocurrency theft (SEC. 3). Crucially, the bill explicitly states that the President can target a “criminal enterprise” that includes a foreign government. This is where things get complicated quickly. When a private, non-military group is authorized by the U.S. government to seize the property of a foreign government on foreign soil, that is a massive escalation that blurs the line between law enforcement and an act of war. The bill requires the commissioned group to post a security bond, set by the President, ensuring they follow the mission instructions—a small check on enormous power.
While the idea of aggressively fighting back against international scammers sounds appealing, the implementation raises serious questions about accountability. When the military or federal law enforcement operates overseas, they follow strict rules of engagement and are part of a clear chain of command. By handing this authority to private actors, the U.S. government is essentially outsourcing paramilitary action. Imagine a scenario where a private contractor, operating under a letter of marque, mistakenly targets a U.S. citizen or a legitimate business overseas while trying to track down a scammer. The bill grants the President sweeping discretion to decide who is “part of a criminal group” and who gets commissioned, which means decisions about international seizure and capture could be made with less public oversight than traditional military operations. This approach could lead to international incidents or unintended conflicts, putting both the commissioned private actors and any U.S. interests in the region at significant risk.