FORCE Act: President's Ability to Lift Cuba's Terror Sponsor Status Blocked by New Bill

The "Fighting Oppression until the Reign of Castro Ends Act," or FORCE Act, directly blocks the President from removing Cuba from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. The bill mandates that Cuba can only be removed if it meets all the conditions originally laid out in the 1996 LIBERTAD Act, a high bar requiring significant democratic reforms within Cuba. Essentially, this ties the hands of the executive branch, preventing any change in Cuba's status without major concessions from the Cuban government.

Shackling the Executive

This bill explicitly prohibits the President or Secretary of State from removing Cuba from the terrorism list unless the stringent conditions of Section 205 of the LIBERTAD Act are met. The referenced law, passed in 1996, set requirements for a transition government in Cuba. The FORCE Act defines a "state sponsor of terrorism" by referencing existing U.S. laws, including the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4318(c)(1)(A)), the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and the Arms Export Control Act. This means the definition is tied to existing legal frameworks, but those frameworks can be subject to interpretation.

Real-World Roadblocks

For everyday people, this bill means continued tension between the U.S. and Cuba. Imagine a small business owner hoping to import Cuban goods or a family looking to easily travel to visit relatives. This bill keeps those possibilities locked down. The existing sanctions and restrictions associated with Cuba's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism will remain firmly in place, impacting travel, trade, and financial transactions. For example, U.S. companies looking to invest in Cuba's emerging private sector will continue to face significant legal and financial hurdles. Cuban entrepreneurs will have a harder time accessing international markets and financing.

Sticking Points and Long-Term Chill

One of the major challenges is that the LIBERTAD Act's conditions are quite demanding, requiring substantial political and economic changes in Cuba. The FORCE Act not only reinforces these conditions but also removes any flexibility the President might have had to adjust policy based on changing circumstances. This could make diplomatic engagement significantly more difficult. Long-term, this could perpetuate the existing stalemate, hindering any progress toward normalization of relations, and maintaining a closed-off Cuba.