The STOP China Act prohibits the use of federal transit funds to purchase or maintain transit vehicles and related infrastructure produced by entities tied to foreign nations deemed a national security risk.
Eric "Rick" Crawford
Representative
AR-1
The Safeguarding Transit Operations to Prohibit China Act (STOP China Act) bans the use of federal transit funds to purchase or maintain transit vehicles and related infrastructure connected to specified foreign entities, primarily those linked to China. This prohibition targets "covered vehicles" supplied by "covered entities" to prevent national security risks and unfair trade practices. The law mandates the creation of a public watchlist identifying these restricted entities to ensure compliance.
The newly proposed Safeguarding Transit Operations to Prohibit China Act—or the STOP China Act—is a major federal crackdown on where public transit agencies can buy their buses, trains, and charging equipment. Essentially, the bill slams the door shut on using federal dollars to purchase or maintain any rolling stock (that’s the industry term for train cars and buses) or electric powertrains that are produced by or supplied by companies linked to nations the U.S. government considers adversaries.
This isn't just about the company's headquarters; the ban is broad. A company is considered a “covered entity” if it’s owned, controlled, or even just financed by a “covered nation” or a “covered individual.” Control is defined loosely enough to include having a majority of the voting shares, board representation, or even an informal agreement to act together. If a transit agency signs a contract for a new bus or train after this law passes, federal money cannot touch it if it has these foreign ties (SEC. 3, SEC. 4).
The immediate goal is clear: reduce national security risks and stop U.S. taxpayer money from indirectly funding foreign industrial policies. Congress is concerned that foreign nations, particularly the People's Republic of China, are using subsidized overcapacity to undercut American manufacturers, making the U.S. supply chain dangerously dependent. To enforce this, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) has to create and maintain a public “watch list” of all the banned companies and component manufacturers, updating it every 90 days for the first six months (SEC. 3, SEC. 4).
For the average person, this sounds like a win for national security and domestic jobs, but here’s where the rubber meets the road: public transit agencies operate on tight budgets and tight schedules. They rely heavily on federal grants to replace aging fleets. By severely limiting the pool of eligible suppliers, especially in specialized areas like electric buses and their powertrains, the bill could dramatically restrict competition. Less competition usually means higher prices and longer wait times for equipment. If a transit agency can’t get the vehicles it needs quickly or affordably, that translates directly into delayed service upgrades, older buses on the road, or potentially higher local taxes or fares to cover the increased procurement costs.
One of the biggest concerns here is the sheer breadth of the definitions. The bill relies on existing external definitions of “covered nation” and then applies a very wide net to define “covered entity.” If you’re a domestic manufacturer, but 10% of your components come from a subsidiary of a company on the USTR’s watch list, or if a foreign investment fund has a non-controlling but significant stake in your operation, you could suddenly find yourself blacklisted from federal contracts. This level of complexity creates massive compliance headaches for transit agencies and suppliers alike, demanding constant vigilance over supply chains.
Furthermore, the USTR is tasked with creating this powerful blacklist, which essentially determines who can and cannot compete for billions in federal contracts. While they must consult with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Transportation, the power to define “control” and maintain this list grants significant, potentially subjective authority to a single agency. This puts a lot of power in one place, which is always worth keeping an eye on.
In short, the STOP China Act is a policy bazooka aimed at national security concerns in the transit sector. While the intention to protect U.S. interests is clear, the practical impact is that transit agencies might face a much smaller, more expensive menu when trying to buy the next generation of public transportation. The success of this law hinges on whether domestic manufacturers can quickly scale up to fill the void—otherwise, the public will be the one paying the price for reduced competition, either through slower service or higher costs.