This Act requires the Secretary of State to report on the adequacy and customization of counterintelligence training for US diplomatic staff serving in high-risk posts.
Michael Lawler
Representative
NY-17
The Protecting American Diplomats Act mandates that the Secretary of State conduct a comprehensive review of counterintelligence training for U.S. personnel serving in high-risk diplomatic posts. This review must detail the current training content, delivery methods, and identify any existing weaknesses in staff readiness. The resulting report, due within 120 days, must also propose specific improvements to strengthen the Department of State's counterintelligence defenses overseas.
The new Protecting American Diplomats Act is essentially a mandate for a security check-up at the State Department. It requires the Secretary of State to deliver a comprehensive report to Congress within 120 days detailing the quality and sufficiency of counterintelligence (CI) training provided to staff working in high-risk diplomatic posts overseas (SEC. 2).
Think of this as an internal audit on security readiness. The State Department has to lay out exactly what CI training Foreign Service Officers, Diplomatic Security agents, and even local staff hired abroad are getting. They need to explain how often this training happens, whether it’s in a classroom or a simulated scenario, and how they customize it to meet the specific security threats in places like Moscow, Beijing, or wherever the geopolitical temperature is running high. If you’ve ever had to sit through mandatory annual compliance training at your job, this is that, but with much higher stakes.
This isn't just a box-checking exercise; the report needs to be brutally honest. The State Department must identify any existing gaps or weaknesses in the CI readiness of the staff currently deployed. For example, if local staff—who often have the deepest community ties but might lack top-tier security clearances—aren't getting sufficient training on spotting foreign intelligence recruitment efforts, the report must flag it. This move directly addresses the security of personnel who are often on the front lines of global competition.
Furthermore, the Secretary must assess how well the State Department is coordinating with other government agencies, like the intelligence community, when designing this training. This is critical because effective counterintelligence isn't just about what the State Department knows; it’s about sharing real-time threat intelligence across the entire government apparatus. Finally, the report must include specific recommendations for improving training standards and delivery to make the whole system more robust.
For the people actually working overseas—the ones managing visa applications, negotiating trade deals, or tracking human rights issues—this bill means better preparation for the very real dangers of foreign espionage and surveillance. If the State Department acts on the findings, it translates into fewer security compromises and safer working conditions for diplomats and their families. The public benefit here is straightforward: a more secure diplomatic corps means a more effective foreign policy.
It’s worth noting that while the main report must be public (unclassified), the Secretary is allowed to include a separate, classified section for sensitive details. This is necessary for national security, but it does mean some of the most granular information about current weaknesses might not be fully transparent to the public. Also, this entire reporting requirement is temporary; it sunsets two years after the Act becomes law, meaning Congress will need to follow up to ensure the recommended improvements are actually implemented and maintained long-term (SEC. 2). Overall, this is a positive step toward ensuring that the people representing the U.S. abroad are equipped to handle the threats they face.