New Bill Forces Allies and U.S. Embassies to Ditch 'Untrusted' Foreign Telecom Gear

This bill, the Countering Untrusted Telecommunications Abroad Act, is essentially a global tech cleanup operation run by the U.S. State Department. It targets telecom equipment and services—think 5G networking hardware—that the U.S. government deems a security risk, specifically calling out companies closely tied to the Chinese government like Huawei and ZTE. The main goal is to promote secure, reliable phone and internet infrastructure worldwide, arguing that global security is directly linked to U.S. national security (SEC. 2).

The Global Tech Audit: Checking on Our Friends

If you’ve ever had to audit your own company’s tech assets, you know it’s a massive headache. Now imagine doing that for the entire 5G network of every U.S. ally. That’s exactly what the Secretary of State is mandated to do. Within 180 days, and then annually for two years, the State Department must report to Congress on which allied countries are using "untrusted" equipment in their 5G networks (SEC. 3).

This isn't just a simple yes/no check. The report must detail which mobile carriers are using the risky gear, whether that gear is running the critical "core" of the network or just the "periphery," and what plans, if any, the allies have to rip out the old gear and replace it with trusted alternatives. For a country relying heavily on a provider like Huawei for their 5G rollout, this report creates immediate diplomatic pressure and a clear expectation that they need a replacement plan—and fast. The bill also wants to know if they plan to use untrusted gear for future 6G networks or Open Radio Access Network (ORAN) rollouts.

Cleaning House at U.S. Embassies

It’s not just our allies getting a tech inspection; the State Department is also being told to clean its own house. Congress noted that a significant chunk of the State Department’s telecom contractors have supply chain ties to China or Russia. The bill requires a detailed report on how U.S. embassies are complying with existing bans on "covered telecommunications equipment or services" (SEC. 4).

This means every embassy must report on how far along they are in removing banned equipment, which embassies are fully compliant, and what the hurdles are for those lagging behind—be it cost, lack of supply chain visibility, or other issues. If an embassy granted a waiver to use this gear, the justification and phase-out plan must be reported. Crucially, the State Department must also assess the risk of intelligence services accessing data on embassy staff's personal devices if those devices are serviced by companies like Huawei or ZTE. For the diplomats and staff working abroad, this provision is about securing their communications against potential state-sponsored snooping.

The U.S. as Global Telecom Matchmaker

Beyond the audits and reports, the bill sets up a proactive system to support "trusted" telecom projects internationally (SEC. 5). The Secretary of State and the Assistant Secretary of Commerce will select specific projects that align with U.S. national security interests. Once selected, the U.S. government will throw its diplomatic weight behind them, helping the host countries overcome regulatory or political roadblocks. The U.S. Trade and Development Agency is also encouraged to provide early-stage funding and support.

This provision is the carrot to the reporting requirement’s stick. Instead of just telling allies what not to use, the U.S. is offering to help them build secure alternatives. For U.S. technology companies that provide these trusted alternatives, this creates a clear diplomatic channel and endorsement for their products in foreign markets. However, it also concentrates significant power in the State and Commerce Departments to pick winners and losers in the global telecom development space, steering market direction based on U.S. security interests.