This bill mandates the creation of strategies within the National Health Security Strategy for biological attribution and for an early warning system against biological, chemical, and radiological threats.
Dan Crenshaw
Representative
TX-2
This bill amends the Public Health Service Act to mandate the creation of a comprehensive **Biological Attribution Strategy** to determine the source of biological threats. It also requires the development of an **Early Warning Strategy and Implementation Plan** to rapidly detect and respond to biological, chemical, and radiological dangers. The legislation focuses on improving federal coordination, developing new diagnostic technologies, and establishing clear trigger points for threat investigation.
This legislation amends the Public Health Service Act, requiring the government to create two major new national security strategies focused on public health. First, it mandates a detailed Biological Attribution Strategy aimed at figuring out the source and origin of any biological hazards or pathogens that could cause a pandemic. Second, it requires an Early Warning Strategy and Implementation Plan to detect biological, chemical, and radiological dangers across the U.S. landscape.
Think of the Biological Attribution Strategy (Section 1) as a detailed playbook for investigators. It’s not enough to know there’s a problem; this plan makes federal agencies spell out exactly how they will determine where a threat came from—whether it was naturally occurring, accidental, or intentional. This strategy must clearly define the roles of every relevant federal agency and set specific trigger points—the exact level of incident that forces them to launch a full investigation into the source. The goal is to build the strongest possible national capability for this kind of detective work, complete with milestones and timelines for success.
Crucially, the bill requires the process for making an official attribution determination to factor in national security concerns if necessary. While this ensures coordination with intelligence agencies like the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), it introduces a potential complication: the final determination of a pathogen’s origin might be influenced by security interests rather than purely scientific findings. For the average person, this means the government is trying to get ahead of the next big outbreak by being able to identify the source quickly, but the process could become less transparent due to security clearances.
Section 2 focuses on building a better net to catch threats before they become a crisis. The Early Warning Strategy and Implementation Plan is designed to create a robust, continuous system for spotting biological, chemical, and even radiological dangers. This means looking beyond traditional clinical reporting and investing heavily in new technologies for diagnostics and sequencing.
The plan specifically calls for continuous monitoring using broad sources like wastewater systems, airports, and major transportation centers—moving public health surveillance out of the hospital and into the infrastructure we use every day. For instance, if you live in a major metro area, this means the government is actively looking for new COVID variants or synthetic drugs like fentanyl in the water you flush. This system must be flexible enough to adapt to new chemical threats and ensure that new detection technologies can be rolled out quickly during an emergency.
Implementing these two strategies requires massive coordination. The Secretary of Health must consult with state and local health departments, private companies, academics, and key federal players like the CDC and the Assistant Secretary for Strategic Preparedness and Response (ASPR). This aims to prevent agencies from stepping on each other's toes or wasting taxpayer money on duplicated efforts. While the public benefits from better security, federal agencies will face increased administrative costs and compliance burdens to develop and execute these highly detailed plans.
Overall, this legislation is a proactive step toward building a more resilient public health defense, focusing on science, technology, and coordination. It’s the government saying, “We need to know what’s coming, and we need to know where it came from.” The main challenge will be managing the complexity of involving both health experts and national intelligence officials, making sure the pursuit of security doesn't overshadow the need for clear, scientific answers.