This Act establishes a comprehensive U.S. strategy to promote the export of advanced civil nuclear energy technology and cooperation with allied and developing nations while countering the influence of competitors like Russia and China.
Byron Donalds
Representative
FL-19
The International Nuclear Energy Act of 2025 aims to significantly boost the global competitiveness and export of U.S. civil nuclear technology, particularly advanced reactors. It establishes new White House coordination roles and working groups to develop a comprehensive 10-year trade strategy for nuclear exports. The bill also authorizes initiatives to provide financial and technical assistance to developing nations starting nuclear programs, while promoting cooperation with allied nations on next-generation reactor development. Finally, it mandates regular high-level conferences to advance international standards for nuclear safety, security, and sustainability.
The International Nuclear Energy Act of 2025 is essentially a massive, government-wide strategy reboot for exporting American nuclear technology. Think of it as Washington deciding that if we want to hit our clean energy goals and counter global rivals, we need to get serious about selling advanced nuclear reactors overseas—and fast.
The bill establishes an aggressive, whole-of-government approach, complete with a new White House power broker and billions in authorized funding, to make sure U.S. companies are building the next generation of reactors in allied countries. The core purpose is simple: to make it easier to finance, license, and deploy U.S. civil nuclear tech, particularly Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), in nations that are either established partners or are just starting their nuclear programs.
This bill creates a brand-new, high-level position: the Assistant to the President and Director for International Nuclear Energy Policy (Sec. 3). This person is basically the new nuclear export czar, tasked with coordinating a huge list of federal agencies—from State to Energy, Commerce, and the Export-Import Bank. The goal is to stop the usual bureaucratic infighting and get everyone working toward the same objective.
This new leadership has to develop a 10-year civil nuclear trade strategy within one year, complete with specific biennial export targets for reactors and fuel. This isn't just a wish list; it’s a mandate to deliver measurable results. For U.S. nuclear companies, this means the government is about to become their most aggressive international sales team, backed by coordinated policy and financing.
The bill authorizes serious money to back this push. Section 14 authorizes $1.439 billion for fiscal year 2026 specifically for the U.S. SMR Initiative to increase competitiveness and accelerate the deployment of these smaller, factory-built reactors. This is a direct investment aimed at making U.S. SMRs market-ready and competitive against state-backed designs from countries like Russia and China.
More controversially, Section 5 allows the Secretary of Energy to waive “U.S. competitiveness clauses” in financing agreements if it helps secure a deal with an allied nation. Normally, these clauses are designed to protect U.S. intellectual property or technology. The idea here is that if a partner nation is ready to finance a U.S. reactor but balks at a specific protection clause, the Secretary can drop it to keep the deal alive. While this might grease the wheels for exports, it raises questions about whether we’re giving up too much control just to win a contract.
The bill focuses heavily on “embarking civil nuclear nations”—countries that are starting a program but generally had a per capita GDP under $28,000 in 2020. Section 8 sets up an International Nuclear Support Initiative, authorizing $50 million annually (FY 2026-2030) for grants and senior advisors to help these nations set up their regulatory and safety frameworks. Grants are capped at $5.5 million per country per year.
This is the U.S. essentially paying to help developing nations adopt our technology, ensuring they don't turn to rivals. The bill specifically excludes China, Russia, Iran, and several others from receiving this assistance, underscoring the strategic competition element.
Perhaps the most significant change for the nuclear industry involves the regulatory landscape. Section 11 amends the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to loosen restrictions on foreign investment in U.S. nuclear production facilities, specifically for allies and partners. While the exact new language isn't detailed, the intent is clear: to make it easier for allied countries—like those in the OECD or India—to invest in or operate sensitive commercial and research nuclear facilities here in the U.S.
This change is designed to encourage reciprocal investment and collaboration, but it means that existing barriers designed to prevent foreign influence in highly sensitive areas are being lowered. For a regular citizen, this means that the company building or operating a nearby nuclear facility might increasingly be backed by capital from a designated allied nation.