Taiwan PLUS Act: Five-Year Defense Fast Lane Approved, Treating Taiwan Like a NATO Ally

The newly proposed Taiwan PLUS Act aims to formally upgrade and streamline defense cooperation between the U.S. and Taiwan. Its core purpose is simple: for the next five years, the U.S. government must treat Taiwan as if it were already a member of the elite “NATO Plus” group of nations—a club that currently includes Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, and New Zealand.

This isn't just a symbolic gesture. This designation automatically unlocks a smoother, faster process for Taiwan to acquire U.S. defense equipment, training, and financing. This special treatment applies specifically to key parts of the Arms Export Control Act, essentially cutting through some of the bureaucratic red tape usually involved in Foreign Military Sales (FMS).

The Fast Lane for Defense Gear

If you’ve ever waited in line at the DMV, you know bureaucracy can slow everything down. This bill is designed to give Taiwan the express lane. By treating Taiwan like a NATO Plus partner (SEC. 3 and SEC. 4), the U.S. is signaling a significant commitment to ensuring Taiwan can maintain its self-defense capabilities, which the bill notes is crucial given its status as a major U.S. trading partner and defense customer. Taiwan was the U.S.’s largest FMS customer in 2020, so the volume of sales is already massive.

For the average person, this means a more robust and faster supply chain for defense items. For example, if Taiwan needs maintenance parts for its F-16 fleet or new anti-ship missiles (part of its “asymmetric capabilities” mentioned in SEC. 2), the process should be significantly quicker than before. This streamlining benefits the U.S. defense industry by facilitating sales and, proponents argue, strengthens regional stability by ensuring Taiwan can rapidly acquire necessary defenses.

The Real-World Impact of “NATO Plus” Status

What does this mean on the ground? Think about it in terms of logistics and cost. When a country is part of the NATO Plus group, certain requirements for exporting defense articles and providing military financing are relaxed. This could translate to lower overall costs for Taiwan, as the administrative burden and time spent waiting are reduced. For U.S. taxpayers, the bill asserts this enhanced cooperation is in the national security interest, meaning the U.S. is strategically investing in a key partner’s stability.

However, there are a couple of points worth noting. The bill references previous recommendations to raise the notification threshold for sales and even stop requiring prior notification for routine maintenance and sustainment of equipment already sold (SEC. 2). While this speeds things up, it does slightly reduce the congressional oversight that currently exists over ongoing defense transfers. It’s a trade-off: speed and efficiency versus detailed reporting.

The Five-Year Timer and the Broad Authority

The enhanced cooperation status is set for an initial five-year period. After that, the Secretary of State has the power to extend this status for additional five-year chunks (SEC. 4). The only requirement for extension is that the Secretary must determine that continuing the cooperation is in the “national security interests of the United States.”

This is a pretty broad standard. While it ensures flexibility to adapt to changing geopolitical situations, it also means the decision rests entirely on the Secretary’s judgment using a wide-ranging definition. They only have to notify Congress 14 days before the next five-year period starts. For those who prefer tighter congressional checks on foreign policy decisions, this broad grant of authority to the Executive Branch might raise an eyebrow, even if the initial intent is clear: making sure Taiwan remains secure without unnecessary delays.