Congress Moves to Lock Down Taiwan Policy: Executive Branch Must Now Get Approval Before Cutting Arms Sales

This bill, officially the Six Assurances to Taiwan Act, is Congress’s way of putting the U.S. policy toward Taiwan in concrete. It’s not about changing the policy; it’s about making sure future Presidents can’t change it on a whim. The core of the bill is to officially codify the “Six Assurances”—the six points the U.S. promised Taiwan back in 1982—and then require Congress to sign off before the Executive Branch can make any major shifts in that policy. Think of it as Congress adding a mandatory two-factor authentication process to a sensitive foreign policy account.

The Six Assurances: What We Promised

For those who haven't studied 1980s foreign policy, the Six Assurances were basically a set of promises made to Taiwan when the U.S. was negotiating with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This bill (Sec. 2 and Sec. 4) reinforces that the U.S. never agreed to things like setting a date to stop selling arms to Taiwan, consulting with the PRC about those sales, or mediating between Taipei and Beijing. Why does this matter now? Because by writing these historical points into law, Congress is making it crystal clear that these commitments are non-negotiable elements of U.S. policy. This provides predictability, which is a big deal for stability in a region that affects global supply chains and the economy.

The New Congressional Veto Power

Here’s where the real-world impact hits the Executive Branch (Sec. 5). The bill sets up a mandatory review process for Congress before the President can take specific, potentially status-quo-altering actions. These actions include pausing or stopping defensive weapons deliveries to Taiwan, mediating disputes between Taiwan and the PRC, or pressuring Taiwan to negotiate. Before the President can do any of that, they have to notify Congress.

Once Congress is notified, a review clock starts ticking—30 calendar days normally, or 60 days if the notification happens between July 10th and September 7th. During this entire review period, the President cannot spend any taxpayer money to move forward with the proposed action unless Congress passes a formal “joint resolution of approval.” If Congress passes a “joint resolution of disapproval” and overrides a potential Presidential veto, the action is permanently blocked. This means if a future administration wanted to significantly cut military aid to Taiwan, Congress would have a powerful, time-bound veto.

Who Benefits and Who Pays the Cost?

This bill is a win for policy stability and Congressional oversight. For Taiwan and its allies, it reinforces the long-term U.S. commitment, making it harder for any single administration to change course dramatically. This increased predictability is good for everyone doing business in the region. The cost, however, is paid by the Executive Branch. The President loses flexibility and speed in a potentially fast-moving crisis. While the intent is to prevent bad policy shifts, this new process could slow down necessary diplomatic or security responses if the White House and Congress are locked in a disagreement over strategy. For instance, in a rapidly escalating situation, having to wait 30 days for a joint resolution could be an eternity. The bill prioritizes procedural checks over executive agility, a trade-off Congress clearly feels is necessary to protect what they view as vital national interests.