This bill mandates increased annual disclosure from institutional investment managers regarding their use of proxy advisory firms and certification that their voting decisions align with shareholder economic interests.
Barry Loudermilk
Representative
GA-11
This bill amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to impose new annual disclosure requirements on institutional investment managers who use proxy advisory firms for voting decisions. Managers must report how often they followed advisory firm recommendations and detail their process for ensuring votes align with shareholder economic interests. Very large managers face additional requirements, including performing and reporting their own economic analysis before casting a vote.
This bill takes a hard look at who’s really pulling the strings when massive investment funds vote on company matters. It amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to slap new annual reporting duties on institutional investment managers—the big firms handling your 401(k) or pension—if they use outside proxy advisory firms to guide their votes on shares they own.
Essentially, if a fund manager uses a service like Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) or Glass Lewis to figure out how to vote on a shareholder proposal, they now have to tell the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) exactly what they did. This report must detail the percentage of votes cast that matched the proxy firm’s recommendation, how the manager used that advice, and how they ensured their final vote aligned with their legal duty to act in the shareholders' best economic interests, which the bill defines as maximizing investment returns.
For most managers using proxy advice, the new rules are about transparency and accountability. They have to certify that their voting decisions were based only on the best economic interests of the shareholders. Think of it like this: your fund manager can no longer just hit the ‘Easy Button’ and follow the proxy advisor’s recommendation without proving they actually thought about it. They have to report how often they followed the advice and, crucially, how they made sure their own internal staff were involved in the final decision process. The goal here is to make sure investment staff are earning their keep and not outsourcing critical fiduciary duties to a third party. This could be a good thing for everyday investors, as it forces managers to own their voting record.
If you manage over $100 billion in assets—which is a lot of zeroes and a lot of power—the bill imposes a significant extra layer of compliance. These giant managers can’t just report on their voting; they have to do the actual homework before they vote. Specifically, before casting a vote on any shareholder proposal, they must perform their own economic analysis to confirm the vote serves the shareholders' best economic interests. They then have to include a copy of that analysis in their annual report to the SEC.
This is a massive administrative lift. For a fund managing a portfolio that size, this means hiring or dedicating staff to perform potentially hundreds of detailed, documented economic analyses every year, just to justify a vote. While the intent is to ensure the biggest players are truly prioritizing long-term returns for their clients, the practical challenge is the cost and time involved. This could slow down the proxy voting process and certainly increases the administrative burden and compliance costs for the largest firms, which will likely get passed down somewhere.
This legislation focuses squarely on reinforcing the fiduciary duty of investment managers. If you have money in a retirement fund, this bill is designed to make sure the people managing that money are making voting decisions based on maximizing your returns—not just rubber-stamping a third-party recommendation. The increased transparency into who follows whom, and the requirement for massive funds to document their economic rationale, means less room for passive compliance and more pressure for active, informed decision-making. The real-world impact is that shareholder votes—on things like executive pay, climate strategy, or mergers—should theoretically be better aligned with the purely economic interests of the investors who actually own the shares.