The REVOCAR Act of 2025 prohibits U.S. investment in Venezuela's energy sector until the Maduro regime recognizes the results of the July 28, 2024, election or until December 31, 2027, with potential waivers for U.S. national security interests.
Debbie Wasserman Schultz
Representative
FL-25
The REVOCAR Act of 2025 prohibits U.S. individuals and entities from investing or operating in Venezuela's energy sector until the Maduro regime respects the results of the July 28, 2024, election. The President can waive these prohibitions for national security reasons, subject to Congressional reporting requirements. The prohibitions will end when Maduro recognizes the opposition's victory or by December 31, 2027.
The REVOCAR Act of 2025 aims to put the squeeze on Nicolás Maduro's regime by cutting off U.S. investment in Venezuela's crucial energy sector. This new bill directly prohibits any U.S. person or entity from investing, trading, or operating within the Venezuelan energy industry, including dealings with the state-owned oil company PDVSA. (SEC. 3)
The core of the REVOCAR Act is a financial blockade. It's designed to pressure Maduro to acknowledge the results of the July 28, 2024, presidential election, where opposition candidate Edmundo Gonzalez reportedly won by a significant margin. The bill states that Congress found that over 10,000,000 Venezuelan citizens voted in that election, and credible monitors observed a victory for Gonzalez, which Maduro's regime refuses to recognize. (SEC. 2)
This investment ban stays in place until either the President certifies to Congress that Maduro has recognized Gonzalez's victory and transferred power, or until December 31, 2027 – whichever comes first. So, there's a hard deadline, but also a clear path for the sanctions to be lifted sooner if Maduro concedes. (SEC. 3)
For example, if a U.S.-based oil services company currently provides equipment or expertise to PDVSA, they'd have to cease those operations immediately. Similarly, a U.S. investment firm holding bonds issued by PDVSA would likely need to divest, creating financial pressure on the Venezuelan government. The Secretary of the Treasury, along with the Secretary of State, gets the authority to write the specific rules and enforce the ban, and violations come with penalties under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. (SEC. 3)
There's a significant caveat: the President can waive these prohibitions for up to 90 days at a time if it's deemed "vital to U.S. national security interests." This requires a report to Congress 30 days before the waiver is issued, explaining the reasons, the transactions allowed, and how it impacts efforts to restrict the Maduro regime's finances. These waivers can be renewed, but a new report is needed 15 days before each renewal. (SEC. 3)
The need for detailed reporting to Congress is intended to provide some oversight, but this waiver power could be a point of contention. While genuine national security concerns (like ensuring regional energy stability) might necessitate a waiver, there’s a risk of the power being used more broadly to protect certain U.S. economic interests, potentially undermining the bill's core goal. The repeated use of 90-day waivers, for example, could signal that the administration isn't fully committed to the sanctions, even if they technically comply with the reporting requirements.
This bill represents a clear attempt to use economic leverage to promote democratic transition in Venezuela. It directly targets the energy sector, a lifeline for the Maduro regime. However, the impact on everyday Venezuelans is a serious consideration. While the intent is to pressure the government, prolonged sanctions could worsen the already dire economic situation for ordinary citizens. The effectiveness of the bill hinges on whether the pressure is sufficient to force Maduro's hand and whether the waiver provision is used judiciously, and not for reasons other than those described in the bill. The definition of "respecting" the election results is crucial, as the U.S. could decide that Maduro has met this requirement even if he hasn't fully given up power. (SEC. 3)