Imposes sanctions on foreign individuals involved in actions that threaten the peace, security, or stability of the West Bank, including violence against civilians, property destruction, and terrorism.
Jerrold Nadler
Representative
NY-12
The West Bank Violence Prevention Act of 2025 authorizes the President to impose sanctions, including asset blocking and visa restrictions, on foreign individuals and entities found to be threatening the peace, security, or stability of the West Bank, particularly those involved in violence against civilians, property destruction, or terrorism. It requires the Secretary of the Treasury, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to provide regular reports to Congress on the implementation of these sanctions.
A new piece of legislation, the 'West Bank Violence Prevention Act of 2025,' is on the table, and its main goal, according to its own text, is to address violence and instability in the West Bank, particularly focusing on actions by extremist settlers. The bill states in Section 2 that these activities pose a serious threat not only to peace in the region but also to U.S. foreign policy objectives, like a two-state solution, and even U.S. national security. The core idea? To authorize the President to impose sanctions on foreign individuals deemed responsible for undermining peace and security in the area.
Digging into Section 2, the bill doesn't mince words. It lays out 'Findings' that paint a picture of a volatile situation: 'extremist settler violence, displacement, and property destruction.' These aren't just seen as local issues; Congress, through this bill, would be stating these actions 'constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.' So, the legislation frames itself as a response to a significant international concern with direct implications for American interests, including the safety of U.S. personnel.
So, who exactly could get hit by this, and how hard? Section 3 is where the rubber meets the road. The President would be directed to sanction foreign individuals if they are responsible for, complicit in, or have 'directly or indirectly engaged in' actions threatening the West Bank's peace, security, or stability. This is a wide net, covering everything from directing or implementing threatening policies to participating in violence against civilians, property destruction, or land seizures (Section 3(a)(1)). It also targets leaders of groups involved in these actions, anyone providing 'materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for' sanctioned individuals, or entities owned or controlled by them. Notably, Section 3(a)(5) also includes those who have committed or even 'pose a significant risk of committing' acts of terrorism affecting the West Bank, with 'terrorism' defined in Section 5 as violent acts intended to intimidate civilians or influence governments.
The penalties are serious. First up, asset blocking (Section 3(b)(1)). Using powers from the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) – a law that lets the President regulate international economic transactions during emergencies – any property or financial interests these individuals have in the U.S. (or held by U.S. persons, including foreign branches of U.S. banks) would be frozen. Think locked bank accounts and no moving money around. Second, forget about that U.S. trip (Section 3(b)(2)). Targeted individuals would be inadmissible to the U.S., ineligible for visas, and any current visas would be revoked immediately under the Immigration and Nationality Act. For example, if someone is flagged, their U.S. vacation plans or business trips are off the table.
Now, here's a point to watch: terms like 'actions that threaten the peace, security, or stability' or being 'complicit in' (Section 3(a)(1)) are quite broad. How these are interpreted in practice will be crucial in determining who actually faces these stiff penalties.
Even with these tough measures, Section 3 includes a few ways out. The travel ban part has exceptions (Section 3(c)). It won't apply if someone needs to enter the U.S. for official UN business under the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations. There's also a potential pass if their entry is deemed necessary for 'important United States law enforcement objectives,' based on a recommendation from the Attorney General.
Then come the waivers (Section 3(d)). The Secretary of State or Homeland Security can waive the travel ban if they determine the person's entry 'would not be contrary to the interests of the United States.' This 'national security' waiver is pretty broad and gives significant discretion. What's more, Section 3(d)(2) allows them to skip giving prior notice to the sanctioned individual about this waiver if there's a national security threat, arguing that a heads-up could allow funds to be moved before sanctions bite. While this aims to make sanctions effective, it could mean less transparency around who gets a pass and why, at least initially.
To ensure some level of oversight, Section 4 mandates regular updates. Starting within 90 days of the Act becoming law, and every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury, working with the Secretary of State, must submit a report to relevant congressional committees (like Foreign Affairs and Finance in the House, and Foreign Relations and Banking in the Senate, as defined in Section 5). This report is required to detail how the Act is being implemented and, importantly, must include the names of any individuals sanctioned under it. This provides a mechanism for Congress to track who is being targeted and how the executive branch is using these powers.