The "Reclaiming Congressional Trade Authority Act of 2025" seeks to limit presidential power on trade duty changes and increase congressional oversight on trade actions.
Josh Gottheimer
Representative
NJ-5
The "Reclaiming Congressional Trade Authority Act of 2025" seeks to limit the President and the United States Trade Representative's (USTR) authority to unilaterally impose tariffs or other import restrictions for national security or trade enforcement reasons. It requires the President and USTR to submit proposals to the International Trade Commission (ITC) and Congress, consult with specific congressional committees, and in some cases, receive congressional approval before modifying duty rates or imposing trade restrictions. This Act aims to reassert Congressional oversight on trade policy.
This bill, the Reclaiming Congressional Trade Authority Act of 2025, fundamentally changes who calls the shots on certain U.S. trade actions. In plain English, it aims to give Congress more control over tariffs and import restrictions imposed for national security reasons or by the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), requiring lawmakers' sign-off before many executive branch trade decisions can take effect.
Under Section 2, if the President wants to adjust import taxes (duties) citing national security – think tariffs justified under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the Trading with the Enemy Act, or the International Emergency Economic Powers Act – they can't just pull the trigger anymore. The bill sets up a multi-step process: the President must submit a detailed proposal to the International Trade Commission (ITC), send a request to Congress backed by reports from the Secretary of Defense (explaining the national security rationale) and the ITC (assessing the economic impact), consult with key House and Senate committees, and get a specific "joint resolution of approval" passed by Congress. Basically, Congress has to explicitly say "yes" before these national security tariffs go live.
There's a notable exception: If the President decides "urgent action" is needed due to a national emergency, imminent threat, or similar critical situation, they can impose a temporary duty for up to 120 days without prior Congressional approval. However, the definitions for what constitutes "urgent action" leave room for interpretation, raising questions about how often this escape hatch might be used.
Section 3 tackles the authority of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), specifically actions taken under Section 301(c)(1)(B) of the Trade Act of 1974, often used to respond to unfair foreign trade practices. Before the USTR can impose new duties or import restrictions under this authority, they'll need to submit a proposal to the ITC, notify Congress (including an ITC economic impact report), consult with relevant committees, and then wait 60 days. During that 60-day window, Congress has the power to pass a "disapproval resolution" to block the USTR's proposed action. If Congress doesn't act to disapprove within that timeframe, the USTR can proceed. It shifts the dynamic from executive action followed by potential Congressional reaction to requiring a period for potential Congressional preemption.
This legislation represents a significant shift, potentially slowing down the imposition of tariffs and trade restrictions by adding Congressional review steps. For businesses relying on imports or consumers buying imported goods, this could mean more predictability, as sudden tariff announcements might become less common. However, it could also lead to delays in responding to genuine national security threats or unfair trade practices if the Congressional approval or review process becomes lengthy or politicized.
The requirement for ITC economic impact reports ensures that the potential costs and benefits to the U.S. economy and specific industries are formally assessed before action is taken. While this aims for more informed decisions, the process itself adds layers of bureaucracy. Ultimately, the bill attempts to rebalance trade authority, giving elected representatives a more direct say but potentially introducing new hurdles and delays into U.S. trade policy execution.