PolicyBrief
H.R. 2683
119th CongressJan 12th 2026
Remote Access Security Act
HOUSE PASSED

This bill establishes controls on the remote access of sensitive items by foreign persons under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, requiring consultation with Congress before new regulations are issued.

Michael Lawler
R

Michael Lawler

Representative

NY-17

PartyTotal VotesYesNoDid Not Vote
Republican
2171672228
Democrat
213202011
LEGISLATION

New Security Act Gives Commerce Dept. Power to Regulate Remote Access to Tech by Foreign Users

The newly introduced Remote Access Security Act is all about updating how the government controls sensitive U.S. technology in the digital age. Currently, export controls focus heavily on the physical movement of items out of the country. This bill shifts the focus, giving the Secretary of Commerce the power to regulate remote access to controlled items by foreign persons, even if the tech never physically leaves the U.S.

Why Your VPN Might Matter to National Security

Think of this bill as closing a digital loophole. The core change is in Section 2, which expands the existing Export Control Reform Act of 2018 to treat remote access the same way it treats an export. What counts as “remote access”? It’s defined as a foreign person accessing a controlled item—like specialized software, technical data, or advanced hardware—through a network connection, such as the internet or a cloud service, from a location other than where the item is physically located. This only kicks in if the Secretary of Commerce determines that this access poses a “serious risk to U.S. national security or foreign policy.”

For U.S. companies, especially those in tech, engineering, or manufacturing that collaborate internationally, this means a significant compliance shift. If you have a foreign partner logging into your servers or cloud environment to work on a sensitive project, that interaction could soon require a license or be subject to new regulations. This is a necessary modernization, as digital transfer is often the easiest way to move intellectual property, but it also means U.S. businesses will face new layers of regulatory friction when working with overseas teams.

The Fine Print: When Intentionality Gets Fuzzy

One detail that jumps out in the definition of remote access is that it applies if a foreign person accesses an item “purposefully, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently.” While the bill clarifies that this doesn't change the mental state required for criminal liability, including “recklessly or negligently” in the regulatory definition is a big deal. For example, if a U.S. company sets up a server hosting controlled software and a foreign contractor accidentally connects to it through a misconfigured VPN or network share, that could potentially trigger a violation under the new rules, even if no harm was intended.

This broad language means that U.S. companies need to be extremely precise about their network access controls and authentication processes. Relying on simple passwords or poorly managed access lists might not just be bad security practice—it could become a regulatory liability if a foreign person gains remote access to controlled technology, even by accident. The burden of proof is essentially shifting onto businesses to ensure their digital perimeters are ironclad.

Executive Power and Congressional Oversight

This bill grants significant new authority to the Secretary of Commerce, allowing them to regulate and enforce these new remote access controls across the board. While Section 3 requires the Secretary to consult with key Congressional committees (like the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs) before issuing new regulations, there’s an important catch: Congressional approval is not required. The Secretary only has to inform Congress about the national security risks being addressed and the potential economic impacts.

This structure ensures the executive branch can move quickly to address emerging threats without being slowed down by the legislative process, which is good for national security responsiveness. However, it also means the Secretary has wide latitude to define what constitutes a “serious risk” and how aggressively to regulate it, potentially leading to broad rules that could impact international collaboration and research before Congress has a chance to weigh in on the specifics.