The "No Paydays for Hostage-Takers Act" aims to deter Iran and other hostile entities from taking U.S. nationals hostage by imposing strict penalties, increasing oversight of Iranian assets, and restricting travel for Iranian diplomats.
Michael Baumgartner
Representative
WA-5
The "No Paydays for Hostage-Takers Act" aims to deter Iran and other hostile entities from taking U.S. nationals hostage by imposing strict penalties and increasing oversight of Iranian assets. It mandates detailed reports on the use of restricted Iranian funds, requires reviews of sanctions for hostage-takers, and seeks to limit travel for Iranian diplomats at the United Nations. The Act also directs the creation of a strategy to deter hostage-taking and wrongful detention, and calls for assessing the invalidation of U.S. passports for travel to Iran. Finally, the act seeks to freeze and seize Iranian assets internationally.
This legislation, the "No Paydays for Hostage-Takers Act," ramps up pressure on Iran over the detention of U.S. nationals. It establishes strict reporting requirements on $6 billion in Iranian funds recently moved to Qatar, mandates reviews for sanctioning individuals involved in past hostage-takings under the existing Robert Levinson Act, and directs the development of a formal strategy to deter future incidents. The core goal is to make hostage-taking more costly for Iran and similar actors.
Think of it like an intense audit. Section 4 requires the President to report every 180 days for six years on how that $6 billion, transferred from South Korea to Qatar, is being spent. The reports need granular detail: who got paid, what was bought, where it went, and whether it truly stayed humanitarian. It also demands certification on whether these funds indirectly freed up other Iranian money for military or "malign" activities. Simultaneously, Section 5 pushes for accountability under the Robert Levinson Act. It mandates a review within 180 days (and annually for six years) of U.S. nationals detained by Iran over the last decade, identifying responsible foreign individuals and reporting whether sanctions have been or will be applied, demanding justification if they aren't.
The bill also aims to restrict movement. Section 6 tightens the leash on Iranian diplomats accredited to the United Nations in the U.S., emphasizing that Iran's actions should be a key factor in limiting their travel beyond the immediate U.N. vicinity. It specifically allows visa denials for individuals under certain existing sanctions related to terrorism or proliferation. More significantly for everyday Americans, Section 9 requires the Secretary of State to determine within 90 days (and report annually for three years) if travel to Iran poses an "imminent danger" to U.S. citizens. Based on this, the Secretary must report whether they are using existing authority to invalidate U.S. passports for travel to, in, or through Iran, similar to the current restriction for North Korea. This could directly impact Americans with family ties, researchers, or others seeking to travel there.
Beyond specific funds and individuals, the Act casts a wider net on Iranian assets. Section 7 demands reports detailing Iranian assets over $100,000 blocked globally in the last two years and any changes to their status, including reasons for unblocking. Section 8 directs U.S. officials to work internationally to identify, freeze, and potentially seize assets linked to Iran's problematic activities, including providing technical help to other countries to do so. Finally, Section 10 mandates the creation of a comprehensive U.S. strategy within 180 days focused squarely on deterring hostage-taking by adversaries, clarifying the U.S. stance against ransom payments, and outlining coordination with allies. The overall approach combines financial pressure, accountability measures, travel restrictions, and strategic planning to counter state-sponsored hostage-taking.