This Act prohibits certain port facilities from entering into contracts for ownership, leasing, or operation with entities connected to the governments of China, Russia, North Korea, or Iran.
Ken Calvert
Representative
CA-41
The Secure Our Ports Act of 2025 prohibits critical port facilities requiring federal security plans from entering into ownership, leasing, or operational contracts with entities controlled by or partially owned by China, Russia, North Korea, or Iran. This measure aims to enhance national security by restricting foreign adversary influence over vital U.S. maritime infrastructure.
This section of the Secure Our Ports Act of 2025 is straightforward: it puts a hard stop on who can own, lease, or operate critical port facilities in the U.S. If a facility requires a federal security plan—meaning it’s a major, sensitive port operation—it cannot enter into contracts with state-owned enterprises from China, Russia, North Korea, or Iran. This prohibition isn't just about government entities; it also applies to any foreign company where even a “small percentage of ownership” traces back to those four countries.
Think of this as a national security filter applied to the front door of our busiest ports. The bill (adding Section 70015 to Chapter 700 of title 46) targets the contracts for ownership, leasing, and operation. If you’re a U.S. port operator, you now have to perform extreme due diligence on potential partners. For example, if a large shipping logistics firm based in Europe wants to lease a terminal, the port operator must now verify that zero percent of that firm is owned by, say, a Russian state investment fund or a Chinese enterprise. The bill’s language is intentionally broad, covering any entity where even a small percentage belongs to the targeted nations.
What does this mean for the rest of us? While the stated goal is national security—keeping adversarial governments from having operational control over the ports where everything from your new car to imported electronics lands—there are immediate practical impacts. Port operations are highly competitive, and restricting the pool of potential contractors could potentially reduce competition. Less competition might translate to higher operational costs, which eventually filter down through the supply chain. If port management costs go up, so might the cost of moving goods, potentially impacting inflation or the price you pay at the store.
The most challenging part of this rule is the “small percentage of ownership” clause. For a U.S. company that manages a port terminal, verifying the ownership structure of a massive, globally traded foreign entity is a complex, almost impossible task. Imagine a major international port equipment supplier that has thousands of shareholders, including pension funds and investment groups worldwide. If one of those investment groups has a 1% stake and is deemed to be partially controlled by one of the listed countries, that supplier could be disqualified from contracting. This creates a massive compliance burden and risk for U.S. port operators, who now must constantly monitor the global ownership structures of their partners to avoid violating federal law. This level of scrutiny could slow down contracting processes for necessary port improvements and maintenance, potentially causing operational bottlenecks.