This Act mandates the development of strategies across the Commerce, State, and Defense Departments to prevent U.S. and allied technology from being used in Iranian-made drones supplied to adversaries.
William Keating
Representative
MA-9
This Act aims to prevent the proliferation of Iranian-made drones, which are being supplied to U.S. adversaries, by targeting the flow of Western technology used in their production. It mandates the Departments of Commerce and State to develop comprehensive strategies to stop the export of critical dual-use components, such as microelectronics, to Iran. Furthermore, the Department of Defense must identify military options to block Iran's access to these drone-related technologies and software.
This new piece of legislation, titled the Block the Use of Transatlantic Technology in Iranian Made Drones Act, is essentially a big, coordinated push to stop U.S. and allied technology from ending up inside Iranian drones. You know, the drones Iran is supplying to Russia for the war in Ukraine, and to groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. The bill doesn't mess around: it mandates that three major federal departments—Commerce, State, and Defense—develop concrete strategies and action plans within the next 30 to 90 days to choke off that tech pipeline. The core idea is to close the loophole that lets microchips, GPS modules, and other dual-use electronics, often made by U.S. companies, be rerouted through third-party distributors straight into Iran’s military manufacturing.
If you work for a company that makes microcontrollers, voltage regulators, or microprocessors—basically the tiny brains of modern electronics—this bill is going to affect your supply chain compliance. The Secretary of Commerce is tasked with creating a strategy within 60 days to actively hunt down what specific U.S. technologies Iran is using for its drones. This isn't just about catching shipments at the border; it’s about identifying the U.S. companies making those parts, and more importantly, the foreign distributors who are using “shell companies or other tricky methods” to sneak them to Iran (SEC. 4).
For U.S. manufacturers, this means the Commerce Department will be reaching out, providing updated lists of distributors who are now red-flagged. You’ll have to dedicate more resources to monitoring where your products go after they leave your factory, ensuring you aren't unknowingly supplying components to a hostile regime. It’s a necessary security measure, but it adds a layer of administrative burden and complexity to global sales, especially for smaller tech firms that rely on complex, international distribution networks.
The State Department is being told to run point on the international front. Within 90 days, the Secretary of State must develop a plan to coordinate with allies whose technology is also showing up in these Iranian drones (SEC. 4). Think of it like this: if a German-made GPS unit or a Japanese-made micro-controller is found in a drone used in Ukraine, the U.S. needs to convince Germany and Japan to match the U.S. export controls.
This is a huge diplomatic lift. It’s easy for Congress to say, “make them match our controls,” but aligning international export laws is notoriously difficult and slow. However, if successful, this coordination would create a much stronger, unified wall against Iran’s military supply chain, making it much harder for them to source parts anywhere in the world.
Perhaps the most immediate and intriguing requirement falls on the Defense Department (DOD). The Secretary of Defense has a tight 30-day deadline to figure out a “range of options the U.S. military can use to block or deny Iran access” to drone technologies (SEC. 4). This list of targeted tech is broader, including not just microelectronics but also Computer Aided Design (CAD) software and Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machines—the high-tech tools needed to design and build sophisticated weaponry.
While the goal is clear—stop the tech—the language here is very broad. The DOD’s mandate to find ways to “block or deny” access could involve everything from cyber operations to disrupting specific shipments. Since the bill doesn't specify constraints, the implementation of these “options” will be closely watched. It signals a willingness to potentially use military or cyber tools to enforce these new export controls, which is a significant escalation in how the U.S. approaches technology denial.
Overall, this bill is a highly focused, multi-agency effort to fix a critical national security vulnerability. It puts pressure on U.S. tech companies to tighten their supply chain oversight and demands that the State Department secure international cooperation, all under the shadow of potential military enforcement options from the DOD. It’s a necessary, if complicated, move to ensure American innovation isn't weaponized against American interests.