The Undersea Cable Control Act requires the President to develop a strategy to limit foreign adversaries' access to items needed for undersea cables, promote U.S. leadership in international standards, and seek agreements with allies to eliminate the availability of these items to foreign adversaries.
Thomas Kean
Representative
NJ-7
The Undersea Cable Control Act directs the President to develop a strategy, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce and Secretary of State, to limit foreign adversaries' access to essential items required for building, maintaining, and operating undersea cables. This includes identifying necessary items, evaluating current export controls, engaging with allies to unify export policies, and promoting U.S. leadership in international standards. The President is required to submit regular reports to Congress on the strategy and actions taken, and the Secretary of Commerce must evaluate export controls for relevant items. The goal is to hinder foreign adversaries' involvement in undersea cable infrastructure and promote secure international standards.
New Bill Targets Undersea Cable Security: Aims to Block Adversary Access to Key Tech
This legislation, the "Undersea Cable Control Act," directs the President to create and implement a strategy aimed squarely at preventing "foreign adversaries" from getting their hands on the technology and components essential for building, operating, and fixing the undersea cables that form the backbone of the global internet.
Mapping the Cable Landscape
The core of the bill requires a deep dive into the world of undersea cables. The President, working primarily through the Secretary of Commerce, needs to figure out exactly what items (think specialized fiber optics, repeaters, power feeding equipment, specific software) are critical (Sec. 2). The strategy involves identifying which countries or companies currently supply these items, particularly focusing on allies who are major players in this market. It also mandates identifying entities controlled by foreign adversaries that are involved in the undersea cable business. This isn't just about hardware; the plan also includes boosting U.S. influence in international bodies that set the technical standards for this equipment, essentially trying to write the rules of the road for future cable tech and monitor adversary activity within these groups.
Tightening the Flow: Export Controls and Diplomacy
Once the key items and players are identified, the bill pushes for action on two fronts. First, the Secretary of Commerce must evaluate these critical items for potential export controls under existing regulations like the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) (Sec. 2). This could mean adding specific cable technologies to the Commerce Control List, requiring licenses for export, especially if the tech could end up with an adversary. The evaluation needs to consider how the item might be used and who the end user is. Second, the President is required, within a year, to actively negotiate agreements with allied nations (Sec. 2). The goal is to create a unified front, getting partners to adopt similar restrictions to prevent adversaries from simply buying the needed tech elsewhere. Regular updates to Congress on these negotiations are mandated.
Real-World Ripples: Security vs. Supply Chains
So, what does this mean in practice? The big idea is to enhance the security of the vast network of undersea cables that carry nearly all international data traffic, protecting them from potential tampering or disruption by nations deemed adversaries. However, implementing this involves navigating a complex global supply chain. Identifying and potentially restricting the export of specific "items" could impact U.S. tech companies that develop or use this technology, potentially affecting costs or international collaborations. Furthermore, getting international allies to agree on coordinated export controls is a significant diplomatic challenge. While the aim is security, the practical effects could touch on everything from international trade relations to the speed and cost of future internet infrastructure upgrades, depending on how broadly terms like "item" and "foreign adversary" are applied and how successful diplomatic efforts are.