Prohibits the FCC from granting licenses or market access to satellite systems and earth stations held or controlled by entities that produce or provide covered communications equipment or services.
Frank Pallone
Representative
NJ-6
The Secure Space Act of 2025 prevents the FCC from granting satellite licenses or market access to entities that produce or provide certain communications equipment or services considered a security risk. This prohibition extends to companies and their affiliates involved in producing or providing covered communications equipment or services. The FCC is required to implement rules to enforce this act within one year.
This bill, the Secure Space Act of 2025, tells the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to hit the brakes on approving certain satellite and ground station operations. Specifically, it prohibits the FCC from granting new licenses, market access, or authorizations for satellite systems and earth stations if the company involved (or its affiliates) also produces or provides 'covered communications equipment or services'. This ban kicks in as soon as the bill becomes law, and the FCC gets one year to write the detailed rules.
So, what counts as 'covered communications equipment or services'? This bill doesn't spell it out; instead, it points to definitions already established in the Communications Act of 1934, likely referencing updates from laws like the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019. Think equipment or services deemed a national security risk – the kind targeted by previous 'rip and replace' mandates aimed at removing tech from specific foreign suppliers from U.S. networks. This new act essentially extends that security focus into space, applying it to companies seeking FCC approval for satellite systems, access to the U.S. market for foreign satellite systems, and authorizations for the ground stations (both individual and larger 'gateway' stations) that communicate with them.
The immediate effect is a potential roadblock for companies whose operations rely, even indirectly through affiliates, on technology flagged under that 'covered' definition. If a satellite operator uses ground equipment from a listed provider, or if the operator itself is linked to such a provider, they could be denied FCC approval starting from the date of enactment. This could benefit domestic tech providers or those not associated with 'covered' equipment, potentially giving them a competitive edge. However, it could also narrow the field of satellite service providers, potentially impacting choices and maybe even costs for consumers or businesses relying on satellite communications, especially in areas with limited options. The reliance on an external, potentially evolving definition of 'covered' tech introduces uncertainty until the FCC clarifies the specifics in its rules within the mandated year.