The "Promoting Resilient Supply Chains Act of 2025" aims to bolster U.S. supply chain resilience by expanding the responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Commerce, establishing a Supply Chain Resilience Working Group, and mandating reports to Congress on critical supply chains and potential vulnerabilities.
John James
Representative
MI-10
The "Promoting Resilient Supply Chains Act of 2025" aims to bolster U.S. national security by strengthening critical supply chains and reducing reliance on potentially adversarial nations. It expands the responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Analysis, establishes a Supply Chain Resilience Working Group, and mandates assessments and reports to Congress on supply chain vulnerabilities and strategies for improvement. The Act focuses on identifying and mitigating risks, encouraging domestic manufacturing, and collaborating with allied nations to ensure a stable supply of critical goods and technologies. This bill prioritizes transparency and collaboration between government, industry, and educational institutions to prepare for and respond to potential supply chain disruptions.
The Promoting Resilient Supply Chains Act of 2025 sets up a significant government effort, spearheaded by the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Analysis, aimed squarely at making sure the U.S. can get the essential goods it needs, especially during crises. The core idea is to map out vulnerabilities in our most important supply chains – think critical medicines, energy components, or key technologies – and figure out how to make them tougher. This involves creating a new multi-agency Working Group and requires a detailed assessment of these critical chains within one year of the bill's enactment.
So, what does this assessment actually involve? Section 3 lays out a hefty to-do list for the Assistant Secretary and the new Working Group (which includes folks from Defense, Homeland Security, Energy, Health, and others). Within a year, they need to map out these critical supply chains, model how they'd hold up against potential 'supply chain shocks' – defined in Section 7 as anything from pandemics and cyber-attacks to natural disasters or trade fights – and pinpoint the gaps. They'll evaluate how much critical stuff U.S. manufacturers and those in allied nations can actually produce, assess how disruptions might rattle the market, and even look at the manufacturing workforce. Think back to the scramble for masks and computer chips recently; this aims to identify those kinds of choke points before a crisis hits for goods deemed 'critical' – meaning their absence could seriously harm national security, the economy, or essential services (Section 7).
Beyond just mapping problems, Section 2 gives the Assistant Secretary the job of actively promoting more stable and secure supply chains. A key part of this is encouraging businesses to rely less on countries flagged as potential risks (specifically referenced as countries described in Section 7(2)(B), though the bill itself doesn't list them) for critical goods. The goal is to nudge manufacturing of these vital items back to the U.S. or to 'ally or key international partner nations' – countries considered reliable partners (Section 7). For example, if a crucial component for medical equipment is currently made mostly in a country later designated as risky, this initiative would support efforts to move that production line stateside or to a close ally, theoretically making the supply less likely to be disrupted by geopolitical events.
Getting a clear picture of private supply chains requires businesses to share sensitive information. To encourage this, Section 3 offers significant protections for 'critical supply chain information' that companies voluntarily provide to the government for this initiative. This info would be shielded from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (specifically citing exemption 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3)), kept out of certain legal proceedings like civil lawsuits, and protected from state and local disclosure laws. The idea is that a company, say a semiconductor firm, could share details about its supply vulnerabilities without fearing that data will end up in competitors' hands or be used against them in court. It's a trade-off: potentially more honest information shared with the government, but less public transparency about those potential risks. Importantly, the bill clarifies that companies are not required to share information or follow any recommendations.
While the bill sets ambitious goals, Section 5 states clearly that no additional funding is authorized to carry out these new tasks. This raises practical questions about how effectively the Commerce Department and the multi-agency Working Group can execute this extensive mapping, analysis, and strategy development using only existing resources. Furthermore, the entire initiative has a built-in expiration date: Section 6 specifies that these authorities and requirements will terminate 10 years after the bill becomes law. Finally, Section 4 requires the Secretary of Commerce to conduct an internal review within two years, assessing how well the department's various offices are currently handling supply chain resilience and recommending ways to improve coordination and effectiveness.