The STABLE Act of 2025 establishes a regulatory framework for payment stablecoins, limiting who can issue them, setting reserve and transparency requirements, and clarifying their status as non-securities.
Bryan Steil
Representative
WI-1
The STABLE Act of 2025 establishes a regulatory framework for payment stablecoins, limiting issuance to approved entities and setting standards for reserves, transparency, and risk management. It defines key terms, outlines the approval process for stablecoin issuers, and grants supervisory and enforcement powers to federal regulators, while also allowing state-regulated entities to operate under certain conditions. The act also includes customer protections, interoperability standards, a temporary ban on endogenously collateralized stablecoins, and directs studies on the broader digital asset landscape. Finally, the act clarifies that payment stablecoins are not to be considered securities under existing securities laws.
The STABLE Act of 2025 aims to bring a comprehensive federal rulebook to the world of 'payment stablecoins' – those digital dollars designed for everyday transactions. If this bill becomes law, it will dictate who can issue these stablecoins in the U.S., forcing them to be subsidiaries of existing banks, credit unions, or specially approved nonbank entities. Key requirements include backing every digital dollar one-to-one with super-safe assets like actual U.S. currency or short-term Treasury bills, beefed-up public transparency about these reserves, and a clear supervisory structure under federal banking watchdogs. The main goal is to inject more stability, accountability, and consumer protection into this slice of the digital currency market.
So, who gets to mint these newly regulated digital dollars? The STABLE Act, in Section 3, is pretty clear: only 'permitted payment stablecoin issuers' get a seat at the table. This club includes subsidiaries of insured banks and credit unions, 'Federal qualified nonbank payment stablecoin issuers' (think fintech firms that get a special green light from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, or OCC), and 'State qualified payment stablecoin issuers' operating under a state regulatory system that's up to snuff with federal standards. If you're a company that just holds stablecoins for customers (a 'custodial intermediary'), you'll have 18 months from the law's enactment to make sure you're only dealing in stablecoins from these permitted issuers.
There's a small door open for foreign stablecoin issuers, but only if their home country's rules are deemed 'comparable' to this Act by the U.S. Treasury Secretary, and they agree to U.S. reporting and check-ups. Trying to issue stablecoins without permission? That could cost you a hefty $100,000 per day in civil penalties (Section 3). This part doesn't apply to you just using your own software or hardware wallet for your personal, lawful crypto dealings where you hold your own keys.
The heart of the STABLE Act is all about what's backing these payment stablecoins. Section 4(a) mandates a strict 1-to-1 reserve. For every stablecoin out there, the issuer has to hold an equivalent value in specific, low-risk assets. We're talking U.S. currency, funds in a Federal Reserve bank account, demand deposits at insured banks or credit unions, very short-term U.S. Treasury bills (maturing in 93 days or less), certain repurchase agreements backed by these Treasuries, or shares in specific money market funds that only invest in these approved assets.
Transparency is also a big deal. Issuers must clearly publish their redemption policies and make it easy for you to get your actual dollars back in a timely manner. They'll also need to put out monthly public reports detailing what's in their reserve piggy bank – the total number of stablecoins floating around and the exact amount and type of assets backing them. And forget about any fancy financial footwork with those reserves; Section 4(a)(2) explicitly prohibits 'rehypothecation,' meaning they can't pledge or reuse those reserve assets for other purposes (except for certain repo obligations).
To make sure everyone's playing straight, these monthly reserve reports need to be examined by an independent registered public accounting firm. Plus, the CEO and CFO of the issuing company have to personally sign off on these reports, certifying they're accurate. Lying on these certifications comes with serious consequences: fines up to $1,000,000 and/or up to 10 years in prison, or if done willfully, up to $5,000,000 and/or 20 years behind bars (Section 4(a)(3)(B)).
Beyond reserves, Section 4 lays out more ground rules. Federal regulators will jointly create rules for capital, liquidity, and how issuers manage various risks like interest rate fluctuations and cybersecurity threats, tailored to how risky their specific business model is. Issuers will also be treated as 'financial institutions' under the Bank Secrecy Act. This means setting up anti-money laundering (AML) programs, keeping transaction records, watching for and reporting suspicious activity (those 'SARs' you hear about), and verifying customer identities – basically, the same financial crime-fighting rules banks follow. They also need to comply with all U.S. sanctions laws managed by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
The bill also puts guardrails on what these stablecoin issuers can actually do. Their business is strictly limited to issuing and redeeming stablecoins, managing the reserves, providing related custodial services, and other activities that directly support these functions (Section 4(a)(7)). So, no branching out into unrelated crypto ventures with the same company. And if you were hoping to earn interest on your stablecoin holdings, Section 4(a)(8) says no dice – issuers can't pay interest or yield to stablecoin holders. For those 'Federal qualified nonbank payment stablecoin issuers,' the OCC will be their exclusive federal regulator.
Importantly, Section 4(c) makes it crystal clear: these payment stablecoins are not insured or guaranteed by the U.S. government, FDIC, or NCUA. Issuers must disclose this fact, and it's illegal to misrepresent their insured status. Finally, if you've been convicted of serious financial felonies like insider trading, embezzlement, or money laundering, you won't be allowed to be an officer or director of a stablecoin issuer (Section 4(d)).
Want to become one of these 'permitted payment stablecoin issuers'? Section 5 outlines the roadmap. Whether you're a subsidiary of an insured bank or a nonbank entity, you'll need to apply to your primary federal payment stablecoin regulator (like the OCC for nonbanks, or the Fed/FDIC/NCUA for bank/credit union subsidiaries). The regulators have 30 days to tell you if your application is complete and 120 days after that to give you a yes or no.
An application can only be denied if the regulator thinks the proposed activities would be 'unsafe or unsound' based on the issuer's ability to meet the tough requirements in Section 4. Crucially, wanting to issue a stablecoin on an 'open, public, and decentralized network' isn't a valid reason for denial on its own. If you get a 'no,' they have to tell you why in writing within 30 days, with specific shortcomings and how to fix them. You can then request a hearing to appeal. And if the regulators miss their deadlines? The application is considered approved. This section also requires regulators to report to Congress annually on how long applications are taking. Once approved at the federal level, these issuers generally won't need separate state licenses, as this federal approval preempts conflicting state laws (Section 5(j)).
The STABLE Act doesn't completely sideline state regulators. Under Section 4(b), states can set up their own regulatory systems for stablecoin issuers. If a state's rules are certified by the U.S. Treasury Secretary as meeting or exceeding the federal standards, then 'State qualified payment stablecoin issuers' can operate under that state's oversight.
Section 7 dives deeper into how these state-qualified issuers fit in. State regulators will be the primary supervisors for these entities but can work with federal banking agencies. There's a mandate for information sharing between state and federal watchdogs. However, federal regulators like the FDIC or OCC get 'backup enforcement authority.' If a state regulator doesn't act on a violation of this Act by a state-qualified issuer within 48 hours of being notified, and this inaction poses a 'significant risk of loss to stablecoin holders or threatens U.S. financial stability,' the feds can step in. These state-qualified issuers can also offer their stablecoins in other states without needing a new license there, as long as they notify the host state and follow its rules if they are stricter (and its consumer protection laws, as per Section 7(g)).
If someone else is holding your payment stablecoins, their reserves, or the private keys for you, Section 8 kicks in with customer protection rules. These custodians must be supervised or regulated by a federal or state financial regulator. They're required to keep customer assets separate from their own company funds – a critical protection. This means your stablecoins, private keys, and any cash held for you are treated as your property, shielded from the custodian's creditors if the custodian goes bust. In an insolvency, customer claims on stablecoin reserves get priority over most other claims. This part doesn't apply if you're just using hardware or software that helps you manage your own stablecoins and keys.
The bill also clarifies what isn't considered a 'payment stablecoin' under these new rules (Section 9). For example, a digital asset that can only be swapped for other digital assets (as long as those aren't mainly payment stablecoins or reserve assets) or one mainly used within a closed system for things like loyalty rewards or accessing specific products (think in-game currency) wouldn't fall under this Act's stringent requirements.
The STABLE Act also tackles a few other notable areas. Section 11 puts a two-year pause on the issuance of new 'endogenously collateralized stablecoins.' These are stablecoins that try to maintain their peg to a currency (like the US dollar) by relying solely on the value of another digital asset created by the same issuer or originator – a model that has proven risky in the past.
To better understand the evolving digital asset landscape, Section 12 directs the Treasury Secretary to conduct two major studies, reporting back to Congress within a year. One will look at 'non-payment stablecoins,' including decentralized ones, examining their designs, risks, and uses. The other will analyze the broader impact of payment stablecoins on things like the cost of domestic and international payments, financial access in developing countries (the 'Global South'), their role in mitigating inflation there, and how they might reinforce the U.S. dollar's global reserve status or even reduce U.S. government borrowing costs.
Finally, a significant move in Section 15 is the clarification that payment stablecoins issued by these newly 'permitted payment stablecoin issuers' are not considered 'securities' under several key federal securities laws, including the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This could provide more regulatory certainty for issuers who meet the Act's requirements, distinguishing these payment instruments from investment products.