The Nuclear Ecosystem Drone Defense Act (NEDD Act) expands the Secretary of Energy's authority to use unmanned aircraft systems, including those from foreign entities, for protecting nuclear facilities and materials.
Susie Lee
Representative
NV-3
The Nuclear Ecosystem Drone Defense Act (NEDD Act) expands the Secretary of Energy's authority, allowing exemptions from prohibitions on procuring or operating unmanned aircraft systems from foreign entities, including the use of federal funds. It grants authority to determine classified tracking usage and accounting exceptions. This expansion aims to bolster the protection of nuclear facilities and assets from potential threats posed by unmanned aircraft.
The "Nuclear Ecosystem Drone Defense Act," or NEDD Act, proposes giving the Secretary of Energy new leeway when it comes to using drones, particularly around sensitive nuclear locations. This bill essentially carves out exceptions to existing rules, allowing the Department of Energy (DOE) to buy and operate unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) – drones – from certain foreign sources, even if those sources are typically restricted. The stated goal is to bolster the protection of facilities involved with nuclear materials or weapons components against potential drone threats.
Normally, there are strict rules preventing government agencies from buying or using drones made by specific foreign entities, often due to national security worries like espionage or cyber vulnerabilities. Section 2 of the NEDD Act exempts the Secretary of Energy from these prohibitions. This means the DOE could potentially purchase and fly drones from these restricted foreign sources and use federal money to do so. While this offers flexibility, perhaps allowing access to specific technologies needed for defense, it also raises questions about whether bypassing these standard security protocols introduces new risks, especially around high-value targets like nuclear facilities.
Beyond the foreign drone exemptions, the bill grants the Energy Secretary more operational freedom with potentially less oversight. Section 2 gives the Secretary authority over using 'classified tracking' – the specifics of which aren't detailed – and grants an 'accounting exception.' In practical terms, an accounting exception often means less detailed public reporting on how money is spent. For taxpayers, this could translate to reduced transparency regarding the procurement and operational costs associated with these drone activities. It concentrates decision-making power regarding drone use and spending within the Secretary's office, potentially limiting external scrutiny.
The core justification for these changes is enhancing security. The Act explicitly expands the Secretary's authority to protect a range of nuclear-related sites – including places storing, transporting, or using special nuclear material, plus facilities involved in nuclear weapon component research or production – from drone threats (Section 2). This gives the DOE a clearer mandate and potentially more tools, including potentially controversial foreign drones and tracking methods, to counter perceived aerial threats to critical national security infrastructure. The trade-off appears to be between granting enhanced, flexible defensive capabilities and maintaining established security protocols and financial oversight.